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CONSENSUS OF THE GOVERNED: THE 
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
Raymond Ku* 
What a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and 
forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all 
steps humanly possible to stay within its powers. That is the condi-
tion of its legitimacy, and its legitimacy, in the long run, is the condi-
tion of its life.1 
Our whole political system rests on the distinction between constitu-
tional and other laws. The former are the solemn principles laid 
down by the people in its ultimate sovereignty; the latter are regula-
, tions made by its representatives within the limits of their authority, 
and the courts can hold unauthorized and void any act which ex-
ceeds those limits. The courts can do this because they are main-
taining against the legislature the fundamental principles which the 
people themselves have determined to support, and they can do it 
only so long as the people feel that the constitution is something 
more sacred and enduring than ordinary laws, something that de-
rives its force from a higher authority.2 
INTRODUCTION 
I N America, "The Law Is King,"3 but who makes that sovereign law? What procedures must "they" follow? The recent controversy 
* A.B. Brown University, 1992; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1995. 
The author is a former fellow of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at 
New York University School of Law. The author would like to thank Thomas Stod-
dard, Norman Dorsen, Pamela Coukos, and Evelyn Furse for their thoughtful com-
ments, criticisms, and support. This Article is dedicated to those whose voices are not 
heard. 
1. Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court 52 (1960), reprinted in John H. 
Garvey & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modem Constitutional Theory: . A Reader 202, 
207 (3d ed. 1991). 
2. Walter F. Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 253 
(1910). 
3. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Political Writings 1, 28 (Bruce Kuklick ed., 
1989). 
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over Colorado's Amendment 24 and Oregon's Measure 95 highlight an 
important but little analyzed area of constitutional law: the amend-
ment of state constitutions.6 This omission is especially glaring consid-
ering the growing :importance of state constitutions in the vindication 
of individual rights not protected by current Supreme Court interpre-
tations of the U.S. Constitution.7 The state protection of individual 
4. Amendment 2 was proposed by an initiative submitted to the electorate and 
approved at the Colorado general election of November 3, 1992. The text of the 
amendment reads: 
§ 30b. No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Ori-
entation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or de-
partments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or 
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi-
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, con-
duct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or 
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, 
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section 
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing. · 
Colo. Canst. art. II, § 30b. 
5. Oregon's Measure 9 was proposed by initiative in 1992. The text of the propo-
sal reads: 
§ 41. (1) This state shall not recognize any categorical provision such as 
"sexual orientation," ''sexual preference/, and siiTillar ptuases that include 
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or masochism. Quotas, minority status, 
affirmative action, or any similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of 
conduct, nor shall government promote these behaviors. 
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties and monies 
shall not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, 
pedophilia, sadism or masochism. 
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments, agencies 
and other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Ed-
ucation and the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's 
youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as 
abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse and that these behaviors are to be 
discouraged and avoided. 
(4) It shall be considered that it is the intent of the people in enacting this 
section that if any part thereof is held unconstitutional, the remainiilg parts 
shall be held in force. 
State of Oregon, Voters' Pamphlet: State of Oregon General Election November 3, 
1992 (1992), reprinted in Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republi-
can Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19, 36 n.71 
(1993) [hereinafter Linde, Campaign]. 
6. Both amendments were intended to repeal existing laws protecting gays and 
lesbians under antidiscrimination laws and preventing the enactment of future laws. 
While Measure 9 was defeated at the polls by a vote of 56% to 44%, Amendment 2 
passed by a vote of 53% to 47%. Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Areas Are Jubilant Over Clin-
ton, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8. 
7. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 
548 (Mass. 1993) (holding that education is a fundamental right under the Massachu-
setts Constitution); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to 
subject "procedures that vindicate the fundamental rights ... to the uncertain effects 
that ... will inevitably accompany the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule"); 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) (arguing that state constitutions are the appropriate 
vehicle for protecting individual rights). 
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rights ·beyond the boundaries established by the U.S. Constitution has 
been called the "New Federalism."8 This revolution in federalism and 
state constitutional law, however, has met with a significant backlash 
in which the Colorado and Oregon initiatives are but acts in a much 
larger drama. Former Chief Justice Burger once reminded state citi-
zens that "when state courts interpret state law to require more than 
the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be 
aware that they have the power to amend state law."9 Many inter-
preted this advice as applying not simply to state court decisions but 
to the acts of local and state governments as well.10 Having lost in 
legislatures or in courtrooms, groups attempted to change existing law 
by altering the very foundation of American law, the state constitu-
tion.11 The excessively generous amendment procedures embodied in 
many state constitutions facilitated this counterrevolution. 
The central premise of constitutional governance is that "We the 
People" have the power and the right to alter or abolish the form of 
government under which we liveP As one commentator argued, 
however, "Our constitutional mythology [suggests] that these occa-
sions should be rare and that they should require overwhelming popu-
8. See, e.g., Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State 
Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 
Cal. L. Rev. 1473, 1474 (1987) (describing the "New Federalism"). 
9. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
10. Colorado's Amendment 2 arose in response to the enactment of city and 
county civil rights statutes protecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Proponents of 
Amendment 2 sought to elinlinate all pre-existing civil rights protections and pre-
empt future statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 241-51. 
11. In 1982, Florida voters ratified a constitutional amendment which required the 
state constitutional right against umeasonable searches and seizures to conform with 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Fla. Const. art. I, § 12. See, e.g., D. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal 
Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, quoted in Yale Kantisar et al., Modern 
Criminal Procedure 50 (7th ed. 1990) (discussing how Proposition 8 amended Califor-
nia's Constitution to bring California's interpretation of the exclusionary rule in lock-
step with the interpretations of the Supreme Court of the United States). 
12. These principles apply equally to state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution. 
Some commentators have argued that state constitutions fundamentally differ from 
the U.S. Constitution because the power of state governments is plenary while the 
power of the federal government is lintited. See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam, State Consti-
tutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in 
Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 269, 279-80 (1994) ("[S]tate constitu-
tions traditionally have been available to lintit the otherwise plenary power of states 
to make laws .... ");Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 169, 178-79 (1983) (characterizing state constitutions as documents of 
lintitation and the U.S. Constitution as a grant of specific power). This position, how-
ever, is based upon a fundamental misconception of American constitutional theory. 
See infra part III. As such, the differences between the U.S. Constitution and various 
state constitutions is one of form rather than function. James M. Fischer, Ballot Pro-
positions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
11 Hastings Canst. L.Q. 43, 46 n.12 (1983) ("[T]he differences between the federal 
Constitution a.11d state constitutions are often the result of ballot propositions, rather 
than their cause."). 
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lar agreement."13 Justice Marshall described this mythology iil. detail 
in Marbury v. Madison: 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce 
to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American 
fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very 
great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. 
The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental: 
and as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can 
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.14 
Constitutional change should be rare because a constitution repre-
sents the fundamental law of government meant to endure for genera-
tions and made for "people of fundamentally differing views."15 
Because the constitution represents fundamental law, the myth re-
quires it to be established by extraordinary means, and these means 
are popularly understood as passage by a supermajority16 of either 
states or voters. ][fa constitution is easily changed/7 it loses its funda-
mental nature and the distinction between constitutional law and leg-
islation is obliterated. As Justice Marshall stated, "A constitution is 
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or 
it is Oil a level with orditJary legislative acts, and, lil~e other acts, is 
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."18 
In reality, many state constitutions have blurred, if not obliterated, 
the line between constitutional law and ordinary legislative acts. 
Amending state constitutions is often a commonplace event, and can 
be surprisingly simple.19 Existing procedures make it possible to 
13. Michael S. Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Les-
sons of the Tiventy-Seventlz Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 692 (1993). 
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (I-IoliTtes, J., dissenti11g). 
16. "Supermajorities" are generally defined as any requirement greater than a 
simple majority vote on the proposal. 
17. Many commentators have considered the ease/arduousness of constitutional 
change primarily as a balance between various pragmatic, epistemic, and equitable 
concerns such as protecting the status quo, promoting deliberation, protecting minori-
ties, and allowing government to adapt to changing circumstances. See, e.g., Schlam, 
supra note 12, at 295-96 ("The amendment and revision process ... must be stringent 
enough to provide for continuity in social norms and political rights, but still fterible 
enough ... to meet new circumstances."); Colantuono, supra note 8, at 1507, 1509-11 
(stating that the difficulty in the amendment process may help to protect minorities); 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution 3-4 (Feb. 9, 1995) 
(arguing that the procedures used to change a constitution may differ from those used 
to adopt one) (presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on 
Constitutional Theory, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The problem with 
state constitutional change, however, is not whether state procedures make change 
relatively easy or difficult, but whose views are represented in the outcomes of the 
procedures. 
18. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
19. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 44 ("Amending state constitutions is, by 
comparison, an everyday occurrence."). 
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amend a constitution with only the support of a minority of the voters 
in a state.20 While reforms through these generous amendment proce-
dures have promoted the public good and protected individual liber-
ties,21 they have also eliminated individual rights and served to 
disadvantage disfavored groups under the auspices of "higher law.'m 
Through this "constitutional legislation," citizens and their representa-
tives can prevent state courts as well as current and future political 
majorities from meddling with their policies, principles, or programs 
even when the proposals are inconsistent with the public good and the 
rights of other citizens. This "constitutional legislation" and the pro-
cedures that make it possible are contrary to the general understand-
ing of constitutional law. 
The legitimacy of democratic government in the United States is 
based on two fundamental premises. First, democratic decisionmak-
ing is legitimate because the U.S. Constitution and the various state 
constitutions serve as a limit upon the excesses of democracy.Z3 Sec-
ond, constitutions are legitimate constraints upon democratic self-gov-
ernance because they represent the will of the people as a whole.24 
Unlike democratic legislation, however, constitutional amendments 
are constrained only by the amendment procedures themselves and 
the people's inalienable sovereign authority. In t"bjs context, constitu-
tional legislation is illegitimate because the procedures permit consti-
tutional amendments that do not represent the will of the people as a 
whole. For instance, in order to place an amendment on the ballot, 
Colorado requires the signature of only five percent of the total 
number of votes cast for all candidates for the office of Secretary of 
State in the last election,25 and a simple majority of votes to pass the 
amendment.26 These procedures permit constitutional change even 
though it may reflect only the views of a minority of the state's 
citizens.27 
This Article argues that, contrary to current practices, constitutional 
change is legitimate only when it commands the unanimous support of 
the people, or, because unanimous support is practically impossible, 
when it is accomplished through procedural devices (i.e., representa-
20. For example, Colorado simply requires 5% of the voters for Secretary of State 
in the last election to propose an initiative amendment, and a simple majority vote for 
ratification. See Colo. Canst. art. 5, § 1. 
21. For example, women's suffrage was addressed by initiative and referendum in 
Colorado, Oregon, Wyoming, and Arizona. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? 
An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 13, 45 
{1995); see, e.g., Fla. Canst. art. I, § 23 (recognizing the right of privacy); Or. Canst. 
art. XI-H (providing for pollution control). 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70. 
23. See The Federalist Nos. 10, 52 (James Madison). 
24. See infra part III.B. 
25. Colo. Const. art. 5, § 1. 
26. Colo. Const. art. 19, § 2. 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 56-64. 
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tion, ratification, and supermajority support) that safeguard minority 
interests in an effort to determine the public good and approximate 
the will of the people as a whole. Constitutional change is illegitimate 
when it represents only the will of a portion of the people. This Arti-
cle attempts to answer the question of what makes a constitution or a 
constitutional amendment legitimate, and provides specific content-
based norms, consistent with America's history and form of govern-
ment, to evaluate the legitimacy of constitutional change. 
The examination focuses onthe procedural legitimacy of constitu-
tional change rather than the substantive propriety of constitutional 
amendments. To argue that an: amendment to a constitution is uncon-
stitutional is hopelessly circular.28 One can determine, however, 
whether the amendment procedures make it fair to hold individual 
citizens responsible for the decisions and actions of the group. In ad-
dition, this Article only briefly discusses the role that the U.S. Consti-
tution plays in limiting the substance of constitutional amendments 
because many interesting issues of state law do riot fall into the nar-
row category of rights protected by current Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the discussion will focus 
primarily on state constitutions because their amendment procedures 
have actively rejected the constiiutional myth and accompanying pro-
cedural devices that legitimate constitutional change. While acknowl-
edging a constitution as a limit upon the power of government and 
"normal politics," many states have adopted procedures for determin-
ing what is constitutional that blur, and in some cases obliterate, any 
distinction between "higher lawmaking" and "normal politics. "29 
Specifically, this Article examines and critiques the use of the initia-
tive to amend constitutions because the initiative allows a simple 
majority to amend a constitution without any mechanisms for deter-
mining the will of the people as a whole or for protecting minority 
rights and interests. The absence of safeguards is compounded by the 
fact that in many instances these "majorities" may only represent a 
minority of the citizens in the state. However, "It is the relative ease 
by which state constitutions can be amended by a temporary majority 
that poses a challenge to state constitutional jurisprudence, not the 
particular method by which majoritarian views are implemented. "30 
So while many of the examples used in this Article focus on amend-
28. But see Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 
Yale L. J. 1073 (1991) (arguing that the proposed flag burning amendment would have 
violated principles of Natural Law embodied in the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution). Laurence Tribe has argued that some amendments may be incompat-
ible with fundamental norms embodied within the Constitution; however, the appro-
priateness of an amendment should be left to Congress not the courts. Laurence H. 
Tribe, A Constitution We are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 433, 440-43 (1983). 
29. See infra note 222. 
30. Fischer, supra note 12, at 47. 
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ment by plebiscite, the discussion is a general discussion of constitu-
tional theory and legitimacy. As such, the principles described within 
apply equally to other procedures for constitutional change. Simi-
larly, this Article will not discuss the legitimacy of the initiative or 
referendum as tools for creating "normal" legislation; others address 
that question.31 For the purposes of this discussion, this Article as-
sumes that these procedures are legitimate for normal politics because 
the constitution theoretically provides sufficient safeguards. 
Finally, while much of the discussion examines the Founders' words 
and actions and the constitutional debates following the American 
Revolution, this Article does not look to the intent of the Founders as 
some cold, dead hand of history that guides and limits modern day 
decisionmaking. Rather, it examines the Founders' theories of gov-
ernment and legitimacy because those theories form the foundation 
for American constitutional democracy. Most Americans would prob-
ably agree with these foundations. If these ideas, forged on the anvil 
of the American Revolution, are to be abandoned, however, it should 
not happen silently and without reflection. If the states reject the ba-
sic principles of constitutional democracy, they should do so openly. 
Such fundamental change should not simply be the result of years of 
neglect and erosion. 
Part I of this Article describes existing amendment procedures and 
examines their justifications. Part II argues that the Founders' theory 
of government includes a constitution that represents the will of the 
people acting in their sovereign capacity. Part III examines the vari-
ous procedural methods for defining the people as sovereign and de-
termining their will. Part III concludes that constitutional change is 
legitimate only when it represents the will of the people as a whole, 
which can be determined by requiring unanimous support or by em-
ploying various procedural filters to approximate that will. Given this 
analysis, part IV argues that the constitutional initiative is an illegiti-
mate procedure for constitutional change. Finally, part V outlines 
some possible legal theories that support the claim that existing proce-
dures are illegal as well as illegitimate. 
I. AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 
All American constitutions include some procedure for amend-
ment. As James Madison remarked, "That useful alterations will be 
suggested by experience," cannot be denied, "[i]t was requisite there-
fore that a mode for [altering the Constitution] should be provided."32 
31. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial 
Equality, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1978); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the 
Initiative and Referendum, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 637 (1980); Philip J. Weiser, Note, Acker-
man's Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can it Realize his Aspirations 
for Dualist Democracy?, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 907 (1993). 
32. The Federalist No. 43, at 223 (James Madison) (Bucca.1eer Books 1992). 
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Amendment procedures recognize two basic principles. First, a con-
stitution may need to adapt to changes in circumstance and under-
standing. Existing constitutions may inadequately meet the demands 
of future generations, or they may embody principles that society has 
since rejected.33 Second, amendment provisions recognize the general 
power and right of the people to alter their constitution and govern-
ment. While the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions share these 
basic understandings, the methods for implementing constitutional 
change vary from constitution to constitution. Even i11 the states that 
allow constitutional amendments through initiative, the procedural re-
quirements vary in difficulty from Massachusetts, with the most strin-
gent requirements, to states like Colorado that employ only mi11i1ual 
requirements.34 · 
A. Proposal Requirements 
Every constitution in the United States allows the legislature to pro-
pose a constitutional amendment, and eighteen states specifically pro-
vide for constitutional amendment by initiative.35 In general, most 
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution requiTe a legislature pro-
posing an amendment to approve the amendment by a majority or 
33. See, e.g., U.S. Canst. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (treatLng slaves as three-fifths of a person), 
amended by U.S. Canst. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. Canst. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting 
Congress from banning slavery until 1808); U.S. Canst. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring 
states to return runaway slaves), amended by U.S. Canst. amend. XIII, § 1. 
34. Massachusetts requires the signatures of 3% of the entire votes cast for gover-
nor to submit a proposed amendment to the general court (both houses of the legisla-
ture). The proposed a..mendment must be approved by one-fourth of the general 
court in two successive sessions. If approved, the initiative is then submitted to lhe 
people who must approve the amendment with votes equal to 30% of the total votes 
cast at the last election and also a majority of voters voting on the amendment. See 
Mass. Canst. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 4, §§ 2-5. Initiatives cannot be used to amend 
certain provisions of the constitution including the Declaration of Rights. Mass. 
Canst. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2. Colorado simply requires the signatures of 5% 
of the voters for Secretary of State in the last election to propose an initiative amend-
ment and a simple majority vote on the proposal to ratify the amench-nent. See Colo. 
Canst. art. V, § 1. 
35. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oldahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See The Council of State Goverw11ents, The 
Book of the States 1994-95, at 23 (1994) [hereinafter Tile Book of the States]; Michael 
Colantuono, Pathfinder: Methods of State Constitutional Revision, 7 Legal Reference 
Services Q., Summer/Fall/Winter 1987, at 45, 55-64. Some commentators have sug-
gested that constitutions can be amended by methods not provided for in the text of a 
constitution. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991); Akhil R. 
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). While there may be non textual methods for constitutional 
amendment, this Article argues that those procedures must be consistent \Vith the 
principles set forth in parts III and IV of this Article. 
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supermajority vote.36 In all but one state, the electorate must then 
ratify the amendment.37 
When a constitution provides for amendment by initiative, the 
amendment's proposer is required to obtain the signatures of any-
where from 3% to 15% of the total votes cast in a previous election 
for a particular office (i.e., Secretary of State, Governor, or Presi-
dent),38 or in the case of North Dakota, the signatures of 4% of the 
state population.39 If the proposer obtains the requisite number of 
signatures, the electorate must then vote on the ratification of the pro-
posed amendment. Most constitutions place no limits on the subject 
matter of proposed amendments. Everything in the constitution is fair 
game, including the amendment procedures themselves. 40 
B. Ratification Requirements 
Constitutions also differ as to the number of votes they require to 
ratify a proposed amendment.41 The ratification vote has two compo-
nents, the percentage requirement and the baseline by which the per-
centage is measured. Percentage requirements run from a vote of 
greater than 50% to 75%}2 The baseline also varies. One approach 
is to use the total number of votes cast on the amendment itself.43 
Another approach is to use the total number of votes cast at the elec-
tion.44 A third approach requires that the majority of votes cast in 
favor of the amendment equal at least a threshold percentage of the 
36. The requirement varies from a simple majority to a three-fourths vote. See The 
Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 55-61; U.S. 
Const. art. V, § 1. 
37. Delaware requires the amendment to be approved by two-thirds of the legisla-
ture in two consecutive sessions. The Delaware Constitution does not require the 
amendment to be ratified by the electorate. See The Book of the States, supra note 35, 
at 21; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 56. 
38. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 62-
64. 
39. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 64. 
40. A few states place limits on the subject matter that may be addressed by con-
stitutional initiative. See Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; ill. Const. art. 
XIV, § 3; McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 797-99 (Cal. 1948) (holding that an 
amendment cannot entirely revise the constitution); see also Fischer, supra note 12, at 
55 (noting that a few state constitutions have subject matter restrictions and some 
state constitutions limit the reintroduction of subjects for amendment by ballot); 
Magleby, supra note 21, at 25 ("Subjects excluded from the ballot in some states in-
clude naming a person to office by initiative, emergency legislation, and using the 
referendum to block appropriations."). 
41. This is true for both constitutional amendments proposed by legislatures or by 
initiative. See The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono; supra note 
35, at 55-64. · 
42. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 
55-64. 
43. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 
55-64. 
44. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 
55-64. 
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total votes cast at the election.45 Finally, Nevada requires a majority 
vote in two consecutive elections to ratify an amendment.46 In the 
past, the baseline i11. several states was all the eligible voters of the 
state,47 "not only those who vote, but those who are qualified yet 
failed to exercise the right of franchise. "48 
Most states adopted the baseline of those voting on the proposal to 
facilitate the amendment process. Because of low voter turnout, low 
votes on proposed amendments, and general lack of interest, more 
demanding baselines made the amendment process dif:ficult.49 At the 
time, one commentator pointed out that "Persons voting at an elec-
tion are usually more interested in the individual candidates than in 
the measures proposed .... "50 As a result, he criticized the election 
baseline requirement51 because it "may therefore be said to make the 
amending process practically unworkable .... "52 The reason for his 
criticism was that, unless a question was of significant popular interest, 
proposed amendments could not ordinarily obtain a majority of an 
votes cast at a general election, let alone the support of a majority of 
the state's eligible voters.53 Modem day commentators echo this sen-
timent,54 and today, the difficulty many voters face in making in-
formed decisions contributes to low voter participation.55 
By allowing amendments based upon a majority of those voting on 
the issue, or even a majority voting at the election, current amend-
ment procedures allow a minority or shuple majority of the eligible 
voters in a state to amend a constitution. Given the persistent prob-
45. Mass Const. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 4, § 5 (requiring at least 30% of the votes 
cast at the election); Neb. Const. art. III, § 4 (requiring a threshold of 35% of the 
votes cast at the election). 
46. Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2. 
47. Idaho, Indiana, Wyoming. See Dodd, supra note 2, at 185-86. 
48. Id. at 186 (quoting State ex rel. Blair v. Brooks, 99 P. 874 (Wyo. 1909)). 
49. Jd. at 188. 
50. Id. 
51. !d. at 187. Most states had already abandoned the baseline of the electorate as 
a whole. Jd. 
52. Jd. at 197-98. 
53. ld. at 200. 
54. See, e.g., Schlam, supra note 12, at 367 ("Super-majorities for voter ratification 
of all amendments seem a superfluous and unconstitutional impediment to the funda-
mental right to exercise sovereignty"); New Mexico ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing 
Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 153 (N.M. 1968) (stating that requiring a three-quarters 
supermajority to amend the state constitution would be illogical); see also Dennis W. 
Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation 
Conundrum Regarding State Constitutional Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 Okla. 
City U. L. Rev. 3 (1992) (criticizing excessive barriers to constitutional initiatives); 
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 162 
(1993) ("Although the Framers put the Constitution largely out of the reach of 'Fac-
tions' ... they did so at the cost of depriving the majority of meaningful control over 
the content of the Constitution .... "). 
55. Julian 1~. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Dernocracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503, 1508-
09 (1990). 
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lem of low voter turnout, 56 these plans permit amendment by a minor-
ity, and, "[I]n fact amendments are usually adopted by a minority of 
the people and often by a very small minority."57 For example, Colo-
rado's Amendment 2, a highly publicized and controversial amend-
ment, was ratified by only a fraction of Colorado's citizens. The votes 
cast for Amendment 2 represented 50.91% of the total votes cast at 
the election,58 40.63% of registered voters,59 33.21% of eligible vot-
ers,60 30.97% of citizens eighteen years of age and older,61 and 23.49% 
of the total population.62 As Professor Walter Dodd pointed out as 
early as 1910, 
The plan of permitting the adoption of proposed amendments if 
they receive a majority of the votes cast upon the question of their 
adoption or rejection, practically results in the adoption of any pro-
posal to which there is no strong opposition, even though there may 
be little sentiment in favor of it.6:f 
Combined with the ability to propose amendments by initiative, ex-
isting procedures allow the fundamental law of a state to be amended 
to reflect only the view of a minority of voters in the state as long as 
there is no significant or effective opposition, and sometimes when 
there is genuine opposition.64 
W'nile the facility with which most state constitutions can be 
amended should be a source of concern in general, it is especially 
troubling because factions have amended state constitutions against 
the interests of unpopular and disadvantaged groups. Colorado's 
Amendment 2 and Oregon's Measure 9 attempt to prohibit and repeal 
laws prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians.65 Similarly, 
the California and Oregon Constitutions were amended to frustrate 
56. The 55% voter turnout in the 1992 Presidential election ended a 30-year slide 
in voter turnout. See Robert Pear, 55% Voting Rate Reverses 30-Year Decline, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 5, 1992, at B4. The United States, however, still ranks as having one of 
the lowest rates of voter turnout of all industrialized nations. See 1 Encyclopedia of 
Government and Politics 203-04 (Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan eds., Rout-
ledge 1992). 
57. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200. 
58. There were 1,597,166 votes cast during the 1992 election. Telephone Interview 
with Delores Lanier, Librarian, Colorado Legislative Counsel's Office (Apr. 25, 
1995). 
59. In 1992, 2,003,375 citizens registered to vote. Id. 
60. 2,451,000 citizens were eligible to vote. Id. 
61. According to census statistics there were approximately 2,628,000 citizens over 
the age of 18. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994 
(Sept. 1994). 
62. Colorado's total population during 1992 was approximately 3,465,000. Id. 
63. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200 n.139. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 230-39. 
65. See supra notes 4-5; see Linde, Campaign, supra note 5. 
} !, 
546 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
state constitutional rights to adequate education.66 The Florida Con-
stitution was amended to make English the officiallanguage.67 Cali-
fornia also amended its constitution to permit housing 
discrimination,68 restrict the rights of criminal defendants protected by 
the state constitution,69 and most recently, California approved Prop-
osition 187, which denies public services to illegal aliens.70 
C. Justifications 
Commentators generally consider the initiative and referendum to 
be the products of the Populist and Progressive movements that saw 
representative government as corrupted by moneyed interests and un-
responsive to the people.71 TI1e initiative and referendum were 
designed to counteract the political influence of moneyed elites, the 
general unresponsiveness of the legislature, and to reflect the genuine 
will of the people.72 TI1e Supreme Court of Oregon, in 1910, ex-
pressed the underlying belief of the procedures' supporters that, 
"[T]he nearer the power to enact laws and control public servants lies 
with the great body of the people, the more nearly does a government 
take unto itself the form of a republic-not in name alone, but in 
fact:m The continued vitality of the tools of direct democracy also 
reflects an emphasis on majoritarian democracy. As one commenta-
tor noted, "Majoritarian democracy, we are constantly reminded, is 
the core of our constitutional system .... Proponents of direct democ-
racy regularly champion the plebiscite as the means by which to hear 
the genuine voice of the people."74 Adherents of this position include 
some of the most distinguished Justices of the Supreme Court. Ac-
cording to Justice Black, "Provisions for referendums demonstrate de-
votion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."75 And 
as Justice Holmes stated in his famous dissent, "I think that the word 
66. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6 (limiting property taxes); Or. Const. 
art. ;a,§§ 11a-11f (constitutionalizing the use of local property taxes to fund public 
schools). 
67. Fla. Const. art. II, § 9. 
68. This amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court in Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
69. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28 (Victi.;n's Bill of Rights). 
70. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Court Blocks New Rule on Immigration, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 17, 1994, at A16. 
71. See Ellis P. Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America (2d ed. 1912); Jonathan 
S. Gellman, Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting 
Processes, 6 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 97, 110 (1977). 
72. Sirico, supra note 31, at 640; Magleby, supra note 21, at 16-17; see also James 
A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American 
Government (1990) (noting that progressive reforms were aimed at minimizing the 
role of representational intermediaries that stood between the public and its 
government). 
73. Kiernan v. Portland, 112 P. 402, 405 (Or. 1910). 
74. Eule, supra note 55, at 1513. 
75. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). 
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liberty ... is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome 
of a dominant opinion .... "76 1hls view is also apparent among a 
generation of scholars who feel a need to apologize for the "anti-dem-
ocratic" nature of judicial review.77 Liberal constitutional amendment 
procedures appear to be the natural outgrowth of equating popular 
sovereignty with majoritarian democracy78 and a popular distrust of 
representative government.79 Nevertheless, the remainder of the dis-
cussion demonstrates that majoritarian democracy is not the core of 
our constitutional system, and that existing procedures for constitu-
tional amendment by initiative are inconsistent with accepted princi-
ples of constitutional governance. 
II. THE FoUNDATIONS oF CoNSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
To understand when constitutional change is legitimate, one must 
understand what a constitution represents. An examination of the 
principles of constitutional government developed during the found-
ing of the U.S. government reveals the essence of a constitution. The 
American Revolution was "one of the greatest revolutions the world 
has known, a momentous upheaval that not only fundamentally al-
tered the character of American society but decisively affected the 
course of subsequent history."80 The Revolution was revolutionary in 
two senses: First, it altered the control of government, and second, 
and perhaps more importantly, it fundamentally transformed the 
terms of political thought. As historian Gordon Wood remarked, 
"The Americans of the Revolutionary generation had constructed not 
simply new forms of government, but an entirely new conception of 
politics .... "81 Today, U.S. citizens take it for granted that "We the 
People" are the source of government power and that the constitution 
provides the standard by which all other laws are evaluated-"So en-
thralled have Americans become with their idea of a constitution as a 
written superior law set above the entire government against which all 
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
77. See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 17-18 
(1907); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpreta-
tion of the Constitution of the United States 162-64 (1962); Alexander Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch (1962); John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review (1980). 
78. See generally Schlam, supra note 12 (arguing that to allow for growth of state 
constitutional law there must be ease and frequency of textual revision to provide 
evidence of popular amenability to change); Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that "We 
the People" have a legal right to change the constitution through a majoritarian and 
populist mechanism). 
79. See Arrow, supra note 54, at 6-15. 
80. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 5 (1992). 
81. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787 at viii 
(1969). In this discussion, I draw heavily from Professor Wood's remarkable work. 
Readers interested in a detailed analysis of the period should read the work in its 
entirety. 
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other law is to be measured that it is difficult to appreciate a contrary 
conception. "82 Titis section examines the theory that gave birth to this 
new conception of government, and what that theory has to say about 
the legitimacy of constitutional change. Much of the discussion ap-
pears to be straightforward and uncontroversial; however, existing 
state amendment procedures seem to ignore this theory or at least 
demonstrate how these fundamental premises of constitutional gov-
ernance have fallen into disfavor. 
A. Government as Sovereign 
The concept of sovereignty was one of the principle points on which 
the Americans and British differed: "The idea of sovereignty, that 'in 
all civil states it is necessary, there should some where be lodged a 
supreme power over the whole,' was at the heart of the Anglo-Ameri-
can argument that led to the Revolution."83 Prior to the American 
Revolution, the government in whatever form was considered sover-
eign, and its power was unlimited. The people were subordinate to 
government and subject to its power. 
For example, during the Revolution, Parliament was the supreme 
power i.n Britain. All law was "subordinate and controulable at [the] 
pleasure of, and created, for the most part, by, parliament" including 
the British Constitution.84 The British made no distinction between 
the constitution and law. The terms were synonymous: "For Black-
stone and for Englishmen generally there could be no distinction be-
tween the 'constitution or frame of government' and the 'system of 
laws.' All were one: every act of Parliament was in a sense a part of 
the constitution, and all law, customary and statutory, was thus consti-
tutional."85 Given this conception of sovereignty, Parliament could 
not violate the constitution or the rights of the colonists. All political 
and civil rights owed their existence to Parliament. 
Under this conception, the government granted rights. Bills and 
statutes securing the people's rights were agreements made between 
the rulers and the ruled. Documents like the Magna Carta recognized 
and recorded the people's rights against "a power that exists in-
dependent of their own choice. "86 The documents embodied the con-
cessions that the people extracted from government in contracts 
between the sovereign and the people. As John Adams noted, 
" 'Their running in the stile of a grant is mere matter of form and not 
of substance.' They were reciprocal agreements, 'made and executed 
between the King of England, and our predecessors,' and like Magna 
Carta, they were the recognition, not the source, of the people's liber-
82. Id. at 260. 
83. Id. at 345 (quoting John Adams' diary). 
84. Id. at 263. 
85. Id. at 261. 
86. Id. at 378. 
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ties."87 If the government breached its contract, the people's only re-
dress was revolution.88 The Founders. rejected the concept that 
government was sovereign and that the rights of the people were sub-
ject to its will. From the 1760s through the 1780s, the colonists halt-
ingly developed a revolutionary conception of sovereignty that would 
replace the medieval view that government was the supreme power 
over all of society. 
B. The People as the Fountain of All Power 
The American Revolution drastically reconceptualized the concepts 
of sovereignty and the written constitution. First and foremost, the 
Founders argued that the people, not government, were the supreme 
power. Second, they transformed the written constitution from simply 
another law created by government to the supreme law created by the 
people as sovereign. Finally, the Founders saw government power as 
granted by the people through the constitution and subject to its re-
straints. This conception of government found its roots in Enlighten-
ment rationalism,89 influenced by thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and Voltaire. The colonists, however, developed a 
uniquely American theory of constitutional governance.90 Tnis theory 
was summed up by a commentator of the time: 
The constitution should be the avowed act of the people at large. It 
should be the first and fundamental law of the State, and should 
prescribe the limits of all delegated power. It should be declared to 
be paramount to all acts of the Legislature, and irrepealable and 
unalterable by any authority but the express consent of a majority 
of the citizens ... _91 
Thus, the Founders envisioned an original form of government in 
which the people as sovereign granted power through a written 
constitution. 
Flipping the classic conception of sovereignty on its head, the Foun-
ders maintained that the people, not government, were sovereign. 
Time and time again, they stated that "[T]he people are the only legit-
imate fountain of power."92 But aside from the rhetorical force of the 
statement, what does it mean for the people to be sovereign? During 
the revolution and founding, it meant that Parliament had no inherent 
authority to govern the colonies. Because Parliament did not derive 
87. /d. at 269. 
88. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
89. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 22-54 
(1967). 
90. See generally Wood, supra note 81 (describing the American system of politics 
and its underlying assumptions as truly original). 
91. Thomas T. Tucker, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting by a Fair State of Matters, 
to Remove Party Prejudice 30-31 (Charleston, 1784), quoted in Wood, supra note 81, 
at 281. 
92. The Federalist No. 49, at 255 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
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its authority from the colonists and did not represent their interests, 
the colonists were under no legal or moral obligation to obey. Today, 
it means that a government's authority and existence is dependent 
upon the people. In other words, "All authority is derived from the 
people at large, held only during their pleasure, and exercised only for 
their benefit."93 Under this conception, government is not an in-
dependent creature with which the people must bargain and negoti-
ate. Instead, legitimate government is the creation and servant of the 
people as a whole. It is subordinate to the supreme power-the 
people. 
This principle of sovereignty is embodied in every constitution in 
the United States. For example, the Oregon Constitution states: 
We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal 
in right: that all power is inhe~ent in the people, and all free gov-
ernments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their 
peace, safety, and happiness; and they have at all times a right to 
alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they 
may think proper.94 . 
And, of course, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution begins with the 
declaration that "We the People of the United States ... do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."95 
Having established the people as the supreme power in society, the 
Founders needed something to give this concept practical force. The 
written constitution became the vehicle for turning rhetoric and the-
ory into political reality. As early as the 1760s the colonists had 
moved "toward a definition of a constitution as something distinct 
from and superior to the entire government including even the legisla-
tive representatives of the people."96 As Samuel Adams wrote in 
1768, "[I]n all free States the Constitution is fixed; and as the supreme 
Legislative derives its Power and Authority from the Constitution, it 
cannot overleap the Bounds of it without destroying its own founda-
tion."97 This movement culminated in the conclusion that a constitu-
93. Thcker, supra note 91, quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 281. 
94. Or. Canst. art. 1, § 1. See also Cal. Canst. art. 2, § 1 ("All political power is 
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may re-
quire."); Colo. Canst. art. 2, § 1 {"All political power is vested in and derived from the 
people; all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will 
only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole."); Colo. Canst. art. 2, § 2 
("The people of this state have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves, 
as a free, sovereign and independent state; and to alter and abolish their constitution 
and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and 
happiness .... "). 
95. U.S. Canst. pmbl. 
96. Wood, supra note 81, at 266. 
97. Massachusetts House of Representatives to the Speakers of Other Houses of 
Representatives (Feb. 11, 1768), in 1 Writings of Samuel Adams 185 (Cushing ed.), 
quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 266. 
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tion was no longer a regular act of government legislation, but "the 
fundamental law by which all people of the state are governed. It is 
the very genesis of government" and limits its power.98 But what 
gives the constitution this power? What makes its control over gov-
ernment legitimate? As Bernard Bailyn stated, "In order] to confine 
the ordinary actions of government,· the constitution must be 
grounded in some fundamental source of authority, some 'higher au-
thority than the giving out [of] temporary laws.' "99 The Founders rec-
ognized that "This special authority could be gained if the constitution 
were created by 'an act of all' .... "100 
The understanding that the constitution is a creation of the people 
themselves and distinct from regular legislative acts became clear in 
the constitutional debates of the 1780s. With independence, many 
state constitutions, as well as the Articles of Confederation, were chal-
lenged because they had been adopted by legislatures rather than the 
people. For example, South Carolinians charged that " 'we have no 
such thing as a Constitution;' the document of 1778 was 'a mere cob-
web,' since 'the principles of the Constitution are, at present estab-
lished no otherwise than by a simple Act of the Legislature.' "101 
Thomas Jefferson criticized the Virginia Constitution of 1776 for the 
same reasons. When passed by the legislature, the term constitution is 
synonymous with "statute, law, or ordinance."102 It was absurd to 
think that an act of the ordinary legislature could somehow be above 
the power of the ordinary legislature. According to Jefferson: 
To get rid of the magic supposed to be in the word constitution, let 
us translate it into its definition as given by those who think it above 
the power of the law; and let us suppose the convention instead of 
saying, "We, the ordinary legislature, establish a constitution," bad 
said, "We, the ordinary legislature, establish an act above the power 
of the ordinar6: legislature." Does not this expose the absurdity of 
the attempt?1 3 
An ordinary legislature simply did not have the power or authority to 
proclaim the supreme law of a polity. When the Federalists were con-
fronted with the argument that their proposed constitution violated 
the Articles of Confederation, it was, therefore, possible for them to 
argue that: 
Indeed, what did it matter if the Constitution were a violation of the 
Articles, since the Confederation bad been "adopted and confirmed 
without being submitted to the great body of the people for their 
98. Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 793 (W.Va. 1969) (Haymond, J., 
dissenting). 
99. Bailyn, supra note 89, at 182-83. 
100. ld. at 183. 
101. Wood, supra note 81, at 279. 
102. Thomas Jefferson, Writings 249 (The Library of America 1984). 
103. Id. 
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approbation." The Confederation, it was now possible to argue, 
had never rested on "the principle of free governments" and had 
been defective and inferior to the state constitutions because it had 
never been a real constitution, never having obtained "a hi~her rati-
fication, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form." 04 
Because legislatures created these documents, they could change 
them. In fact, many of the original state constitutions were subject to 
the power of the state legislature.105 Having differentiated between 
fundamental and statutory law, Americans during the founding era 
realized that the origins of these documents did not entitle them to the 
status of a constitution. A constitution only gains the status of funda-
mental law when it is adopted and alterable by the sovereign-the 
people as a whole. As the West Virginia Supreme Court noted, "Un-
like ordinary legislation, a constitution is enacted by the people them-
selves in their sovereign capacity and is therefore the paramount 
law."106 Conventions of representatives, elected by the people for the 
express purpose of adopting and altering a constitUtion, and the peo-
ple themselves were considered the only legitimate means of deter-
mining the will of the people: "Only the people by either 'persons 
legally authorized by them or themselves' could create or alter a con-
stitution .... 'The people are the fountain of power, and must agree if 
tl1e mode is altered, the asseu.1bly cannot do it.' " 107 Tl1e .bJstory and 
development of constitutional governance during the founding period 
make it clear that a constitution does not derive its power and legiti-
macy from its title. It is not enough for the government or a group of 
citizens to simply call a document or certain laws a constitution. "It is 
not the name, but the authority which renders an act obligatory."108 
A constitution derives its fundamental, "higher law" status only when 
it represents the will of the supreme lawmaker-the people acting in 
their sovereign capacity. 
C. Constitutional Supremacy 
Under this regime, government action is legitia--nate only when it 
falls within the power granted by the people through the constitution. 
A written constitution, as the direct and basic expression of the sover-
eign, is "the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments 
and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it, 
and must control as it is written until it is changed by the authority 
which established it."109 It applies equally to all elements of govern-
104. Wood, supra note 81, at 534. 
105. See id. at 274-79. 
106. Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 793 (W. Va. 1969) (Haymond, J., 
dissenting). 
107. Wood, supra note 81, at 277. 
108. Jefferson, supra note 102, at 249. 
109. Lance, 170 S.E.2d at 794 (citing 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 56 
(1979)). 
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ment and to all citizens. But why should a constitution bind the legis-
lative acts of the people's representatives or of the people themselves 
when they act through the mechanisms of direct democracy? Why are 
these bodies denied the authority to alter a constitution? It appears 
contradictory to argue that the people have prohibited government 
from establishing religion, when the people, speaking through their 
representatives or through a plebiscite, indicate that they wish to es-
tablish religion. For the modern theorist this problem represents the 
central dilemma for constitutional democracy. In some forms it has 
been described as a conflict between the liberty of the ancients and 
the liberty of the moderns.U0 In others, it represents the heart of the 
claim that judicial review is undemocratic. 
Before one abandons the principles of constitutional democracy be-
cause it "fails" to adequately resolve this dilemma, however, one must 
remember that the Founders faced this very same argument. In a 
probing series of articles written in the 1780s, Noah Webster criticized 
the developing theory of government. First, he argued that "A Bill of 
Rights against the encroachments of Kings and Barons, or against any 
power independent of the people, is perfectly intelligible; but a Bill of 
Rights [or constitution for that matter] against the encroachments of 
an elective Legislature, that is, against our own encroachments on our-
selves, is a curiosity in government."111 According to Webster, the 
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights made sense because "they 
are barriers erected by the Representatives of the nation, against a 
power that exists independent of their own choice. "112 Because no 
such independent power existed in the United States, "[t]he jealousy 
of the people in this country has no proper object against which it can 
rationally arm them-it is therefore directed against themselves, or 
against an invasion which they imagine may happen in future ages. "113 
Without any independent powers to struggle against, Webster ar-
gued that the concept of a binding constitution was antithetical to 
liberty: 
In a free government, said Webster, no political or civil regulation 
should be perpetual, for the people "have no right to make laws for 
those who are not in existence." Jefferson's conviction that the 
Constitution of Virginia was defective because it was not created by 
a special convention and was thus alterable by the ordinary legisla-
ture was foolish, said Webster, and indeed, although Webster did 
not draw the connection, did violence to Jefferson's own concern 
with the tyranny of the past. Americans' efforts to fix a form of 
government in "perpetuity," Webster argued, supposed a "perfect 
110. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 201 (1971) (citing Benjamin Constant, 
Ancient and Modern Liberty (1819)). 
111. Noah Webster, Government, 1 Am. Mag., at 140-42 (1787-88), quoted in 
Wood, supra note 81, at 378. 
112. /d. 
113. ld. 
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wisdom and probity in the framers; which is both arrogant and im-
pudent." Indeed, "the very attempt to make pe1petual constitu-
tions, is the assumption of a right to control the opinions of future 
generations; and to legislate for those over whom we have as little 
authority as we have over a nation in Asia."114 
Webster went on to argue that there was not a practical difference 
between constitutional conventions and legislatures. What was a con-
vention anyway, except: 
"a body of men chosen by the people h1 the manner they choose the 
members of the Legislature, and commonly composed of the same 
men; but at any rate they are neither wiser nor better. The sense of 
the people is no better known in a convention, than in a Legisla-
ture." The distinction between the two bodies was ihus "without a 
difference," "useless and trifling." Since the people had to be repre-
sented in one body or the other,. "of what consequence is it whether 
we call it a Convention or a Legislature? or why is not the assembly 
of the representatives of [the] people, at all times a. Convention, as 
well as a Legislature?" . . . "The people will choose their Legisla-
ture from their own body-that Legislature will have an interest in-
separable from that of the people-and therefore an act to restrain 
their power in any article of legislation, is as unnecessary as an act 
to prevent them from committing suicide."115 
For Webster, the legislature and the people were one and the sa.we. 
"[T]he legislature has all the power, of all the people. "116 As such, 
Webster's arguments rejected any conception of a sovereign power 
over the legislature. While his arguments are powerful, they failed to 
grasp the central argument of the new American theory of 
government. 
The Founders' reply was simple and devastating. There is a funda-
mental difference between the will of various people and the will of 
the people. As Gordon VVood poL"tJ.ted out, "Tl1e legislatl!res could 
never be sovereign; no set of men, representatives or not, could 'set 
themselves up against the general voice of the people.' "117 Govern-
ment whether in the form of kings, legislatures, or groups of citizens 
could never claim the authority of the people. The representatives of 
the people were not the people themselves: "The representation of 
the people, as American politics in the Revolutionary era had made 
glaringly evident, could never be virtual, never inclusive; it was acutely 
actual, and always tentative and partial. "118 This conception of repre-
sentation is also noted by Bruce Ackerman: 
Publius adopts the semiotic understanding in his effort to "repre-
sent" the people of the United States by means of a written text-
114. Wood, supra note 81, at 378-79. 
115. /d. at 379. 
116. Webster, supra note 111, quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 381. 
117. VVood, supra note 81, at 382. 
118. /d. at 600. 
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the Constitution. There can be no hope of capturing the living real-
ity of popular sovereignty during normal politics. The text does not 
aim for phony realism by allowing you to suppose that Congress is 
the People. It provides a picture of government which vigorously 
asserts that Congress is merely a "representation" of the People, not 
the real thing itself.l19 . 
555 
At best, representatives and groups of citizens can claim only to "rep-
resent" the people as paltry images or mere shadows of the people 
themselves. At worst, their interests are separate and antithetical to 
the general body of the people. By the 1780s, the Founders recog-
nized that the people and their representatives were as capable of tyr-
anny and oppression as any monarch: "An excess of power in the 
people was leading not simply to licentiousness but to a new kind of 
tyranny, not by the traditional rulers, but by the people themselves-
what John Adams in 1776 had called a theoretical contradiction, a 
democratic despotism:mo The Founders had moved beyond Web-
ster's naive conception that legislatures actually were the people, and 
that the interests of government and the people were always cotermi-
nous. As James Madison told Jefferson: 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger 
of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the major-
ity of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to 
be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense 
of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the 
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.121 
The constitution therefore was meant to prevent despotism "whether 
it came from Kings, Lords or the people."122 
In response to Webster's charge that a constitution infringed on the 
liberty of future generations, the Founders' reply was again simple and 
devastating. As sovereign, the people always maintained the power to 
alter or replace the constitution. They could do this through the 
amendment mechanisms provided by the constitution, or by exercising 
their primal power as sovereign.123 The ability of the people to alter 
their government, proclaimed Madison, "was one of the 'first princi-
119. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 184. 
120. Wood, supra note 81, at 404. 
121. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 19 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
122. Wood, supra note 81, at 404 (quoting Benjamin Rush). 
123. See generally Ackerman, supra note 35 (observing that a dualist constitution 
enables the people to exercise their power both directly and through their representa-
tives in government); Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that the people have the legal 
right to change the Constitution through majoritarian and populist methods similar to 
the popular referendum inlplied in Article V); Colantuono, supra note 8 (listing vari-
ous state procedures for constitutional amendment or revision). 
i' 
i: 
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pies' of the legal order."124 The founding philosophy was sunnned up 
nicely by James Vvilson: 
"In all governments, whatever is their form, hmvever they may be 
constituted, there must be a power established from which there is 
no appeal, and which is therefore called absolute, supreme, and un-
controllable. The only question," said Wilson, "is where that power 
is lodged?" Blackstone had placed it in the will of the legislature, in 
the omnipotence of the British Parliament. Some Americans, said 
Wilson, had tried to deposit this supreme power in their state gov-
ernments. This was closer to the truth, continued Wilson, but not 
accurate; "for in truth, it remains and :flourishes with the people." 
... The supreme power, Wilson emphasized, did not rest with the 
state governments. "It resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of 
government." "They have not parted with it; they have only dis-
pensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the 
public welfare." ... Unless tl:ie people were considered as vitally 
sovereign, declared Wilson with some exasperation, "we shall never 
be able to understand the principle on which this system was 
constructed." 125 
Sovereignty is not merely derived from the people and vested i_n_ gov-
ernment, to be momentarily reclaimed by them through revolution, it 
is permanently retained by the people. As such, a constitution is not 
antithetical to the liberty of the people, present or future. 126 It only 
binds the acts of government and the representatives of the people; 
the people as sovereign are always free to change the constitution. 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the philosophical under-
pinnings of American government clearly distinguish between what 
Professor Ackerman describes as "higher lawmaking" and "normal 
lawmaking."127 The former represents the will of the sovereign peo-
ple. The latter represents the will of the people's representatives 
whomever they may be.l28 Having outlined the twin foundations of 
124. Amar, supra note 35, at 471. Professor Amar defines the first principles as the 
1ight of a simple majority of the people to alter their form of govem;Tient. As used 
here, however, "first principles" represents only the right of "the people" to alter 
their government. Part IV discusses what constitutes "the people," and specifically 
rejects Professor Amar's definition. 
125. Wood, supra note 81, at 530. See also ChishoL-n v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419, 453-58 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was incompatible with principles of public law and with a republican form of 
government because the state was no more sovereign and no less subject to the law 
than a free man). 
126. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Default 
(Mar. 16, 1995) (arguing that constitutional governance is not antithetical to liberty 
because it guarantees the conditions that legitimate majoritarian decisionmaking) 
(presented at the NYU School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, on file 
with the Fordham Law Review). 
127. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 6-7. 
128. As used here, "representative" means anyone to whom the people have dele-
gated decisionmaking authority. This includes elected and appointed officials and any 
portion of the people. 
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the American science of government-that the people are the sover-
eign authority in society and that the constitution as the expression of 
the people is the fundamental law by which all acts of government are 
subject-the following discussion attempts the difficult task of deter-
mining what procedures are necessary to legitimately claim that con-
stitutional change represents the will of the people acting in their 
sovereign capacity. 
Ill DEFINING "WE THE PEOPLE" 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, American constitutional 
democracy is based upon the principle that the people are the foun-
tain of all political power and authority. The people, not government, 
are sovereign, and a constitution is the written embodiment of their 
will.129 A constitution, being the expression of the sovereign's will, is 
the supreme law by which all other law and government action must 
be evaluated.130 Practically no one publicly disagrees with these 
founding principles. In fact, defenders of existing constitutional 
amendment procedures may argue that the procedures are simply ap-
plications of these principles. Variations in amendment procedures 
simply reflect alternative methods for realizing the same goal-deter-
mining the will of the sovereign people. But what exactly does "the 
people" mean? As Lawrence Sager notes, "[T]o invoke The People is 
to invoke what is at best a metaphor . . . . We never have the people in 
a very interesting or durable sense; what we have are various mecha-
nisms for doing the best we can to get reports and representations of 
the people. "131 If we accept the founding principles of sovereignty 
and constitutional governance, however, there is a limited range of 
procedural mechanisms that can be employed as legitimate methods 
for determining the will of the people. Before discussing these proce-
dures in detail, this Article first addresses the claim that a simple ma-
jority can legitimately claim to speak for the people.132 
129. A constitution can of course be interpreted to embody and promote principles 
other than simply the people's will, including natural law and justice. See, e.g., Rosen, 
supra note 28 (arguing that natural law imposes additional limits); Christopher L. 
Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Princi-
ple and Prudence, 43 Duke L. J. 1 (1993) (arguing that constitutional norms better 
achieve long-term public support for just policies than do moral philosophy policies or 
economic analysis); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (1984) (pro-
posing that the Constitution is open to higher political values and should be inter-
preted as such). This is consistent with Madison's understanding of the constitution as 
well. The Federalist No. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992) ("Jus-
tice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society."). 
130. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 234 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
("Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules 
0 0 0 ."). 
131. Sager, supra note 17, at 21, 23. 
132. I assume that the majoritarian definition of "We the People" is the justification 
for the more liberal state amendment practices. I am willing to concede, however, 
that there may be no rational justification behind those procedures at all. 
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A. Simple Majorities133 
Many state constitutions and some commentators suggest that a 
simple majority of the people has the right and power to alter a consti-
tution. Akhil Amar describes this right of a simple majority to alter 
government and change the constitution as the first principle of con-
stitutional governance.134 There are two main arguments i11 favor of 
this position. The first, the moral position, argues that something of 
moral importance, liberty, and the right to self-determination, is lost 
or compromised whenever political decisionmaking is taken away 
from simple majorities. The second argument is that the "birth 
logic"135 of the U.S. Constitution supports the claim that a delibera-
tive si_mple majority of Americans is sufficient to amend the Constitu-
tion in the name of the people/36 
A powedul and emotionally appealing argument for simple major-
ity rule, or what Ronald Dworkin calls the "majoritarian default," sug-
gests that procedures requiring more than a majority comprom.ise the 
cowuunity's freedom-the right of self-determination or the right of 
the people to govern themselvesP7 As Professor Dworkin points out, 
there are two conceptions of democratic collective action: statistical 
and communal. Collective action is statistical when it represents a 
simple aggregation of individual preferences and actions. Collective 
action is communal when it represents "individuals acting together in 
a way that creates or presupposes a single action that is together 
theirs."133 A rough way of distinguishing between the two is the dif-
ference between the statement that each of us has concluded x and the 
statement that together we have concluded x. While the statistical 
conception of collective action would appear to support the claim for 
133. It appears that no one has argued that constitutional change is legitimate when 
supported by only a minority of the people. 
134. Amar, supra note 35, at 460. This conception of democracy is consistent with 
the classical definition of democracy represented by Aristotle's defir1ition as the "mle 
of many." Aristotle, The Politics 88-89 (Stephen Everson trans., Cambridge Press 
1988). 
135. See Sager, supra note 17. 
136. See generally Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that, although not explicitly stated 
in Article V, a majoritarian mechanism, analogous to a national referendum, is suffi-
cient to amend the Constitution). 
137. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15. This argument was raised by Noah Webster 
duling the founding period. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16. 
138. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 14. 
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majority rule/39 it is inconsistent with the concept of sovereignty of 
the people which requires communal action.140 
Liberty in the context of sovereignty of the people is not a matter of 
any relation between government and citizens in their statistical and 
individual capacities, but rather a relationship between government 
and the citizenry under the communal conception of collective ac-
tion.141 Arguments for self-determination are concerned with the lib-
erty of the people to determine the fundamental law of a polity. 
Before the majoritarian default can claim that the liberty of the peo- 1/,; · 
ple collectively is being infringed, however, there must be some con-
nection between the individual and the group that makes it fair and 
otherwise sensible to treat her as responsible for the decisions and 
actions of the group. Professor Dworkin describes this as "moral 
membership, by which we mean the kind of membership that engages 
self-government."142 Mere membership in a community is not 
enough. For example, slaves in the United States, women prior to 
suffrage, Jews in Nazi Germany, and black South Africans under 
apartheid could be described as members of their respective commu-
nities, but few if any would argue that they were moral members. 
At this point the argument for the majoritarian default turns against 
itself. Before a simple majority can claim the legitimate authority to 
speak for the community as a whole, the conditions for moral mem-
bership, i.e., democratic self-governance, must be satisfied. The deci-
sionmaking procedures must make it fair and sensible to treat the 
outcome of the process as a decision made by every individual in the 
community. In the context of ordinary legislative acts, there is a pre-
sumption that the constitution guarantees these conditions. The con-
stitutional conception of democracy, "presupposes democratic 
conditions: the conditions that a community must meet before it be-
comes true that majoritarian deeisionmaking had an automatic moral 
advantage over all other procedures for collective decision."143 In-
139. This is by no means clear. There is a strong argument that limits upon major-
ity will would in fact increase the individual's freedom to control her destiny. See, e.g., 
Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15 (arguing that "constraints on majority will might well 
expand any particular individuals control of his own fate"); John Locke, The Second 
Treatise of Government (Library of Liberal Arts 1952) (observing that constraints 
upon individual liberty resulting from the social contract expand the individual's abil-
ity to control her own destiny). 
140. See supra part III.B; infra part N.C. This does not mean, however, that all 
collective action in a constitutional democracy must always be communal. In fact, the 
framework established by American constitutional governments represents a hybrid 
of communal and statistical action. 
141. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15. 
142. !d. at 16. 
143. !d. at 17. 
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eluded in these conditions are freedom of speech, the right to vote, 
equal protection, and due process to name just a few. 144 
The presumption that the conditions for moral membership have 
been met does not exist in the context of constitutional change. Since 
a constitution is the fundamental law of a state, when a simple major-
ity acts to change or replace that fundamental law there is nothing to 
ensure that they speak for the people as a community. Either the de-
cisions represent the will of the people as a whole or they do not. 
Standing alone, simple majority rule does nothing to make it fair or 
sensible to treat the decisions of the majority as the decisions of the 
minority.145 There is nothing to guarantee that the conditions for 
democratic self-governance are met. As such, simple majority rule 
only expresses the will of a group of people, not the will of the people 
as a whole. Absent the conditions of moral membership, simple ma-
jority rule cannot legitimately daim the authority to bind the minority 
in the community to the majority's will.146 . 
The second principal argument supporting simple majority rule is 
historical. Akhil Amar argues that the right of a simple majority to 
alter or abolish a constitution is evident in the founding of the U.S. 
Constitution.147 Simple majority rule is "a self-evident corollarJ of 
popular sovereignty," and is discernible in the words and deeds of the 
Founders.148 After a close examination of the Founders' "words and 
144. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard Univ. Press 
1977) (arguing that our background and institutional rights include the fundamental 
right of citizens to equal concern which in tum supports the rights of freedom of 
expression and freedom of choice in personal and sexual relations among others); 
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton Univ. Press 1987) (arguing that in 
a democracy, education must enable all children to participate effectively in the dem-
ocratic process); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) (arguing that edu-
cation and welfare are also conditions for d~mocratic self-governance); Laurence H. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the rights of freedom of 
communication and expression, political participation, religious autonomy, privacy, 
and equal protection); Ely, supra note 77, at 137 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution 
protects benefits, goods, and rights that are essential to political participation, and 
that the "duty of representation that lies at the core of our system requires more than 
a voice and a vote."). 
145. Professor Amar concedes this point when he requires simple majority rule to 
be deliberative. Amar, supra note 35, at 501-03. "The people must talk, listen, and 
vote, and that takes time. (By its very nature, the people's right to alter or abolish 'at 
any time' cannot be instantaneous.) But when they do vote, a majority, however 
small, must in the end prevail over a minority." Id. at 503. 
146. Another related argument is that the principle of equality demands simple 
majority rule. Supermajoritarian requirements are considered minority vetoes be-
cause they allow a minority to block the will of a majority. While equality may cer-
tainly argue in favor of the majoritarian default during ordinary politics, it does not 
support simple majority rule for defining the will of the community as a whole. In the 
end, the argument for equality is exactly the same as the argument for liberty and self-
determination. See Dworkin, supra note 126, at 19-21. 
147. While Professor Amar's thesis focuses on tlle U.S. Constitution, its principles 
are applicable to constitutions in general. 
148. Amar, supra note 35, at 484. 
:;;::;:;.:.:. 
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deeds," however, it is far from clear that the Founders believed that a 
simple majority could legitimately claim to represent the people as a 
community. 
As to the Founder's words, Professor Amar presents a series of 
quotations from different sources and periods during the founding. 149 
The use of some of these quotations is misleading. For example, 
Amar cites Noah Webster for the proposition that the Federalists be-
lieved that majority rule was a universal truth.150 As discussed earlier, 
however, not only was Noah Webster not a Federalist, he was an artic-
ulate opponent of constitutional democracy in general and a firm be-
liever that government, not the people, is the sovereign authority in a 
polity.151 In addition, many of the quotations discussing majority rule 
refer to the people represented in constitutional conventions not the 
people participating in direct democracy.152 Rather than analyze and 
criticize each of the quotations Professor Amar offers, I offer several 
general comments. First, some of the Founders' words do support the 
claim that a majority of the people has the right to alter government, 
and this is in fact one of the "first principles" of the revolution.153 
Madison himself stated that, "the supreme authority, the federal com-
pact may be altered by a majority of them; in like man.t'ler as the Con-
stitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the 
people of the State. "154 This does not mean, however, that a simple 
majority necessarily speaks for the minority in the name of the people 
as a whole. Instead, it can be understood as simply another way of 
describing the people's sovereign right to alter and abolish govern-
ment for themselves.155 For example, during the debates over popular 
sovereignty prior to the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln argued that self-
government was an "absolute and eternal right," but that right did not 
include the right to govern those excluded from the community. 
"When the white man governs himself that is self-government; but 
when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more 
than self-government-that is despotism."156 The right to alter gov-
ernment for oneself is not the right to govern another. 
149. ld. at 481-87. 
150. See id. at 484. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16. 
152. Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L. J. 1971, 1990 (1994) ("When the Framers re-
ferred to constitutional amendment by 'the people,' they were speaking of constitu- i'l 
tiona! conventions."). :: 
153. See supra part II. 
154. Wood, supra note 81, at 533. 
155. Cf Rosen, supra note 28, at 1085-86 (arguing that the people's right to alter 
and abolish the government is conditioned upon a pattern of abuse and usurpations 
or breach of the social compact). 
156. Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraha.m Lincoln 117 
(HarperCollins 1994). 
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Second, even if some of the Founders' words support the idea that a 
simple majority speaks for the people as a whole during higher law-
making, contrary to Professor Amar's claim, their deeds tell a differ-
ent story. Professor Amar focuses on the fact that majority rule was 
used to determine the outcomes at the conventions themselves.157 He 
discounts the use of constitutional conventions and the supermajority 
requirements embodied in Articles V and VII of the U.S. Constitution 
and similar provisions in state constitutions.158 The existence of these 
other procedural requirements, however, and the fact that they were 
accepted and followed, cannot be ignored. Nor can they be cavalierly 
dismissed as surrogates for a lack of technology which would have 
made it possible for genuine direct participation,159 especially because 
+L111P PPu~P'l'nal•l's+~ ex~pl~n~<-ly ~~~~~arl ,...,-,.,..,cot~tutl''"'npl p1P"h1"r1tP" 160 ~ .. Jl'-' _.lL_ ......., ._.. l~ li\...o-!Ll Vl-'_lJ'VL)\...-U VVll>.:l .!. L V .!.l.l..! .J.'-'V.JLU"'-'.JL'-._.u. \.J.._.... 
even accepting Professor Amar's interpretation of the Founders' 
words, an apparent tension exists between their words and their 
deeds. Taken -as a whole, the procedures the Founders employed pro-
vide an important key to understanding when the people have legiti-
mately spoken.161 
Third, simple majority rule has no a priori claim to pride of place in 
democratic governance. There are many methods or protocols that 
the neon!e can employ in democratic decisionl'Tiaking. This does not 
mea~, h'owever, that "[T]here are no reasons sounding in the values of 
[constitutional] democracy for preferring one protocol of political 
choice over another but rather that choice of protocols must be de-
fended, and further that the defense of a given protocol must be seen 
in the context of a rather thick understanding of the circumstances in 
which it is meant to operate."162 Simple majority rule may be legiti-
mate in one context while not in another. Its legitimacy depends upon 
the circumstances in which the voting protocol is meant to operate 
and the principles that govern the political system. As such, Professor 
Amm·'s claim that a simple majority can legitimately alter or abolish a 
constitution simply begs the question. There is nothing to explain why 
a simple majority can clai..'ll the authority to speak for all of society 
when the Founders themselves were concerned with democratic des-
potism. The possibility that "the Founders said so" is both unsatisfy-
ing and simply insufficient. 
Finally, the Founders' statements may simply reflect the political re-
ality that a majority of people can do whatever they want through the 
157. Amar, supra note 35, at 486. 
158. Id. at 481-82, 486-87. 
159. !d. at 502-03. 
160. The Federalist No. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992) ("The 
danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public pas-
sions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional 
questions, to the decision of the whole society."). 
161. See infra part III.B. 
162. Sager, supra note 17, at 23. 
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exercise of raw power. Nevertheless, simply because the majority may 
in reality have the numbers and the power to change government and 
impose their will upon the minority does not make their decisions and 
actions just or legitimate. The minority is under no obligation to rec-
ognize a constitution or a constitutional amendment simply because it 
reflects the will of the more powerful portion of the community-
"[E]ven an insistent majority should not have its way, if power was the 
only thing to be invoked on its behalf. "163 Constitutional change nec-
essarily implies the legitimate right and power to bind an entire com-
munity-not simply a portion of it. Therefore, the concept of popular 
sovereignty does not inevitably lead to simple majority rule. In fact, 
the following discussion demonstrates that simple majority rule is in-
compatible with the principles of popular sovereignty. 
B. Democratic Despotism and the Danger of Factions 
Factions, and the tyranny that they are capable of, are the most im-
portant reasons why simple majorities and minorities cannot legiti-
mately amend a constitution in the name of "We the People." One of 
the principal reasons the Founders created the U.S. Constitution was 
to respond to a new evil, a new tyrant-the people themselves. In 
1776, John Adams called democratic despotism a theoretical contra-
diction,164 but since the revolution, the American experience with self-
governance taught them otherwise. James Madison noted that "Com-
plaints are every where ... that the public good is disregarded in the 
conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not 
according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but 
by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority."165 
James Wilson echoed these sentiments, exclaiming, "Cannot you point 
out instances, in which the people have become the miserable victims 
of passions, operating on their government without restraint?"166 By 
the 1780s, the Founders realized that the classic republican model 
which relied on the virtue of the majority simply did not reflect human 
nature. As Madison wrote to Jefferson, "(T]he invasion of private 
rights is cheifly [sic] to be apprehended, not from acts of Government 
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the con-
stituents."167 Jefferson himself recognized this in his criticisms of the 
Virginia Constitution of 1776: "[One hundred and seventy-three] des-
pots would surely be as oppressive as one;" it makes no difference that 
163. Sunstein, supra note 144, at 19. 
164. Wood, supra note 81, at 404. 
165. The Federalist No. 10, at 42-43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
166. 1 The Works of James Wilson 291 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1967) (1804). 
167. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 The 
Papers of James Madison 295, 298 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977) (footnote 
omitted). 
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"they are chosen by ourselves. A11 elective despotism was not the gov-
ennnent vve fought for."168 As a result, it was no longer reasonable to 
assume that the interests and will of a majority of the people repre-
sented the interests of the people as a whole. Thus, the existing 
American constitutional model was incomplete. 
TI1e American science of government came to recognize the need to 
protect the people as a whole from its constituent parts. Factions were 
capable of undermining the entire revolutionary endeavor. Madison 
defined a faction as, "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights 
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community."169 Now that the authority of government was firmly in 
the hands of the people, by the 1780s, the Founders understood that 
factions were as significant a threat to liberty as any king, aristocrat, 
or foreign government. This stemined from the recognition that peo-
ple, by their very nature, were not some homogeneous entity sharing 
the same interests and aspirations. 
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty 
to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the con-
nection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions 
and his passions \.,.lill have a reciprocal influence on each other; and 
the former will be objects to which the latter will atiach themselves 
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man 
170 
And, unfortunately, as Madison adroitly put it, people are not selfless 
angels incapable of deviating from the public good or oppressing fel-
low citizens: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on gov-
ernment would be necessary. In framing a goverruneni which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
[y]ou must first enable the government to controul the governed; 
and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on 
the people is no doubt the primary controul on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.171 
The Federalists recognized that if left unabated by "auxiliary precau-
tions," people were "much more disposed to vex and oppress each 
168. Jefferson, supra note 102, at 245. 
169. The Federalist No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
170. !d. at 43-44. 
171. The Federalist No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
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other, than to co-operate for their common good.'m2 History has 
only confirmed Madison's diagnosis. 
While the "auxiliary precautions" devised by the Federalists are 
generally associated with controlling factions during normal politics, 
they are also mechanisms for controlling factions during higher law-
making. A key passage from Federalist No. 10 should make this clear: 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister 
views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may con-
vulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its vio-
lence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is 
included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other 
hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the 
public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public 
good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at 
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular govern-
ment, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed 
173 
We learn two things from this passage. First, according to James 
Madison, a minority of citizens cannot legitimately amend a constitu-
tion. They should only be able to express t_heir views by a regular vote 
during normal politics with the constitution mitigating the faction's 
adverse effects. Second, the Federalists designed the elaborate system 
of representation, separation of powers, and checks and balances em-
bodied in the new Constitution to prevent simple majorities from sub-
verting the "public good and rights of other citizens. "174 Because a 
majority can accomplish this through normal politics and potentially 
through higher lawmaking, safeguards against majority tyranny are re-
quired in both. Nevertheless, even if we interpret the safeguards em-
bodied in the U.S. Constitution and subsequent state constitutions as 
controlling the effects of factions during normal lawmaking alone, to 
argue that those same factions are entitled to that power outright dur-
ing higher lawmaking is absurd. The dangers presented by majority 
factions do not disappear when it comes to creating or altering a con-
stitution. If anything they increase. Higher lawmaking requires pro-
tection of the Founder's vision of "We the People." Only unanimity 
or auxiliary precautions that ensure representation of the people as a 
whole can legitimate a constitution or constitutional change. 
C. The People as a Whole 
The concept that the people are the sovereign authority and source 
of all political power is more than mere rhetoric. As discussed above, 
it forms the first and fundamental principle of American constitu-
172. The Federalist No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
173. !d. at 45. 
174. See Sunstein, supm note 144, at 21-23. 
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tional democracy. As James Madison stated, "It is essential to ... a 
[republican] government, that it be derived from the great body of the 
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it 
.•.. "
175 In this context, the people is much more than a metaphor. It 
means the community as a whole is sovereign, not the government or 
any portion of the community. Under this conception, a constitution 
represents collective action in a communal rather than statistical 
sense.176 Decisions are meant to represent the "public good" and not 
simply an aggregation of individual preferences.177 As the poet Fran-
cis Hopkinson described, constitution making i1wolves "[a] whole peo-
ple exercising its first and greatest power-performing an act of 
sovereignty, original, and unlimited."178 Therefore, constitutional 
change is legitimate only when it represents the will of the people as a 
whole. The reason for this was suggested as early as 1776: 
"[I]t is absolutely necessary that the whole should be active in the 
matter, in order to surrender their privileges in this case, as they 
cannot be curtailed without," every adult male, regardless of his 
property-holding or the suffrage restrictions provided in the Consti-
tution being established, was entitled to participate-since it was 
the society itself that was being constituted .... 179 
Massachusetts explicitly incorporated this pril!ciple in its Constitution 
of 1780 which "declared itself to be 'a social compact, by which the 
whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the 
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the com-
mon good.' "180 The communal conception of collective actions leads 
to two possible methods for dete1mining the will of the people. Con-
stitutional change is legitimate only when it actually commands the 
unanimous support of the people, or in lieu of unanimous support, 
constitutional change is legitimate if it is accomplished through proce-
dural devices that safeguard minority rights and approximate the will 
of the people as a whole. 
175. The Federalist No. 39, at 190 (James Maclison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
176. See supra text accompanyi.11g notes 137-46. 
177. See, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract at xxi (Hafner Publish-
ing 1962) (1791) ("Society was for Rousseau not an 'aggregation' of individuals but an 
'association' .... [L]iving in society represented the triumph of interests that were 
clistinctively different from merely individual interests."); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 
2 (stating that many Constitutional provisions require neutrality and prohibit parti-
sanship; government decisions that interfere with individual rights must be based in 
the public good rather than favoritism). 
178. Wood, supra note 81, at 535 (emphasis omitted). 
179. /d. at 289. 
180. /d.; see also Locke, supra note 139, at 48-54 (stating that when men unite to 
form a society they relinquish their inclividual executive powers and authorize society 
to make laws for them as the public good requires). 
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1. Unanimity 
If government is legitimate only when it flows from the people as a 
whole, a simple conclusion is that decisions in the name of the people 
must actually command the unanimous support of the people. Una-
nimity is the clearest means of avoiding factional tyranny. As the 
Founders recognized, "Factionalism in a republic 'should be particu-
larly guarded against, its existence as a free government depending on 
a general unanimity.' "181 A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. 
Suppose there are one hundred people who firmly believe in sover-
eignty of the people. They have gathered together to form a new gov-
ernment and write a constitution for themselves. In the process of 
constitutionmaking, they constantly require consensus. If at any point 
one or more members disagrees with the constitutional proposal, 
there are several possible outcomes. First, those in favor of the propo-
sal may persuade the dissenters that it belongs in the constitution. 
Second, unable to persuade the dissenters that the proposal merits in-
clusion in the constitution, both groups may reach a compromise and 
agree to an alternative proposal. Third, the dissenters may persuade 
the proposal's supporters that it does not belong in the constitution, or 
the proposal's supporters may simply drop the proposal because the 
dissenters cannot be persuaded. Finally, the supporters may insist on 
i..11cludi..11g the proposal i.-•1 the constitution despite the dissenters' objec-
tions. At this point, the dissenters leave and withdraw as members of 
the political communit<j. This does not necessarily stymie the constitu-
tion-making process or bring it to a halt. It simply means that the 
constitution no longer reflects the will of the original community and 
cannot claim authority in their name. In other words, the constitution 
cannot legitimately govern the dissenters. The same would be true 
with any proposed changes to the constitution. This would appear to 
be constitutional governance in its most basic and ideal form. 182 
The requirement of consensus is not the child of some esoteric aca-
demic theory or some abstract modern day notion of justice. It 
originates with the American conception of sovereignty and constitu-
tional governance, and was expressed most recently in the debates 
over the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension 
Act. 183 Unanimity is most apparent in the Articles of Confederation 
and Article VII of the U.S. Constitution. Both authorities required 
181. Wood, supra note 81, at 403. 
182. Of course, the inhabitants could agree to different procedures for nonconstitu-
tional decisions. For example, they could agree that within the linlited powers estab-
lished and circumscribed by the constitution, political decisions could be based on a 
statistical model of collective action. 
183. One prominent position during the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment 
was that ratifications under Article V are to reflect a "contemporaneous consensus." 
See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the 
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 394 (1983) (arguing against absolute Con-
gressional control over the Article V amendment process). 
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consent before they subjected a state to the authority of the larger 
community. All thirteen states rati_iied the Articles, and no one has 
ever suggested that they bound nonsignatories. In addition, the .A.Jti-
cles required the unanimous consent of all the states to alter the docu-
ment.184 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution required the unanimous 
consent of nine states to become effective.185 The assenting states 
could not impose their will upon the dissenting states because, "no 
political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting 
States. "186 While justice and respect for human rights would always 
regulate the affairs between the states, the Constitution would not le-
gally bind dissenters. 
Is unanimity necessarily required to amend a constitution? Could 
not our hypothetical community unanimously agree to adopt proce-
dures that did not require unanimity to amend an existing constitu-
tion? Subject to some logicallirriitations, the answer is, of course, yes. 
Though it is by no means logically compelled, the people as a whole 
could delegate their power to some portion of them. That portion, 
however, does not have the absolute right or authority to do as they 
please. The right and authority of the people as a whole to alter or 
abolish a constitution remain vested in the people as a whole, not their 
delegates. That right is unalienable. As the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion of 1776 declared, "[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalien-
able and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in 
such manner as shall be by that COill!!lllnity judged most conducive to 
the public weal."187 TI1e people's surrogates, as defined by the consti-
tution's amendment and adoption procedures, hold their authority in 
trust not only for the founding generation but for future generations 
as well. If the surrogates pursue a course of action inconsistent with 
the public good or the rights of other citizens, their actions will not 
legitimately command the authority of the people. At best, they 
would represent political decisions and cornmand the limited author-
ity granted by the constitution; at worst, the constitution would pro-
hibit their actions altogether. lif formerly agreed upon procedures or 
the decisions of their delegates always bound the sovereign people, 
even when those orocedures and decisions are inconsistent with the 
genui11e will of th~ people as a whole, then the constitution would L.1 
fact infringe the right of self-determination.l88 
In order to reduce the likelihood that a faction would claim the 
right to legitimately amend the constitution in the name of the people, 
184. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. XIII [hereinafter The 
Articles of Confederation). 
185. U.S. Canst. art. VII. 
186. The Federalist No. 43, at 225 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
187. Pa. Canst. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. V, reprinted in 5 The Founders' 
Constitution 7 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987). 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46. 
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our hypothetical community would require certain procedural safe-
guards to ensure that constitutional amendments are not antithetical 
to the will and interests of the people as a whole. Nevertheless, it may 
not be enough for a proposed amendment simply to be harmless. The 
community may require auxiliary procedures that adopt amendments 
which actually represented the will and interests of the people as a 
whole. Many of the ratification and amendment procedures embod-
ied in American constitutions can best be understood as serving one 
or both of these purposes. 
As Professor Amar rightly points out, the Founders did not require 
a unanimous vote of the citizens or their representatives to ratify 
either the U.S. Constitution or the several state constitutions. Instead, 
they employed procedural safeguards and filters. Conventions ratified 
constitutions, and proposed amendments were subject to a whole host 
of procedural requirements.l89 The reasons for this approach were 
perhaps practical, in part paternalistic, and in part unjust. The Foun-
ders' reasons were practical in the sense that it would have been logis-
tically impossible to bring all the citizens in a state, let alone in the 
entire country, together to deliberate and vote on the merits of a con-
stitution or amendment; paternalistic in the sense that the Founders 
may not have trusted the general body of the people to reach an en-
lightened decision; and simply unjust because the Founders believed 
that certain groups, slaves, women, and the poor in particular, were 
not entitled to voice their opinions.19° Far from allowing simple ma-
jorities to alter constitutions as they pleased, however, the Founders 
employed various filters in an attempt to both screen the harmful ef-
fects of factions from the processes of constitutional change and de-
velop an accurate representation of the will of the people. 
2. Republican Filters 
In lieu of unanimous support, constitutional change is legitimate if it 
is accomplished through procedural devices that safeguard minority 
rights and it represents the will of the people as a whole.191 The 
American theory of government recognizes that it is a mistake to as-
sume that equal citizens in a democracy will always act for the public 
good. Experience demonstrated to the Founders that people were 
quite capable of sacrificing the interests of the community and op-
pressing other citizens. As Madison noted, "Theoretic politicians, 
who have patronized [pure democracy] have erroneously supposed, 
189. See supra part I. 
190. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia reprinted in Jefferson, supra 
note 102, at 264-67 (describing African-Americans as mentally inferior). 
191. See Rawls, supra note 110, at 228-34. Cf Colantuono, supra note 8, at 1494-95 
(arguing that procedurally arduous means of achieving constitutional change are pref-
erable to extratextual revision of state constitutions). John Rawls' original position is 
an example of a procedural device designed to approximate the public good while 
protecting the rights of minorities. 
570 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
that by reducLng mankind to a perfect equality Ln their political rights, 
they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized ancil assimilated in 
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions."192 In an effort to 
shield constitutional change as well as normal politics from passions 
and factional tyranny, the Founders insisted upon auxiliary precau-
tions which operated under two basic principles: deliberation and 
consent.193 Madison observed that "the deliberative process offers 
time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for 
transforming preferences. Public debate ... ultimately leads to reali-
zation of the common good."194 Consent assures that the decisions 
arrived at through the deliberative process are consistent with the will 
of the people as a whole. The various procedural devices employed 
by the U.S. Constitution and many of the state constitutions promote 
one or both of these principles. 
The Federalist Papers open with the declaration that "you are called 
upon to deliberate on a new Constitution."195 While the 1780s were 
certainly an era of broad public debate, representation was one of the 
principal methods for promoting deliberation and reducing the harm-
ful effects of factions during constitutionmaking. By having the peo-
ple elect a smaller group of citizens to represent them, the Founders 
hoped 
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best dis-
cern the true interests of their country, and whose patriotism and 
love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or par-
tial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen 
that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the peo-
ple, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced 
by the people themselves convened for the purpose.196 
Representation was and still is generally employed at the principal 
moments of constitutional change-proposal and ratification. The 
Philadelphia Convention itself is perhaps the paradigmatic example of 
representation at the proposal stage, and as discussed earlier, every 
constitution in the United States allows the legislature or constitu-
tional convention to propose amendments.197 From the very begin-
ning of this Nation's history, and in recent debates over several 
192. The Federalist No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
193. The Federalist No. 38, at 182 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). De-
spite his insistence on simple majority rule, Professor Amar is unwilling to allow sim-
ple majorities to amend a constitution instantaneously or for any reason. "Majority 
rule does not necessarily imply majority will or majority whim." Amar, supra note 35, 
at 501. 
194. Eule, supra note 55, at 1527; see also Sunstein, supra note 144, at 22 (stating 
that "the right to instruct" provision was the antithesis to political deliberation). 
195. TI1e Federalist No. 1, at 2 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992) 
(emphasis added). 
196. The Federalist No. 10, at 46-47 (James Maclison) (BuccaneeT Books 1992). 
197. See supra part I. 
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proposed amendments to the Constitution, the representation filter 
has been an effective means of promoting deliberation at the proposal 
stage.198 The Constitution also employs this filter at the ratification 
stage of amendment. The ratification conventions of Articles V and 
VII of the U.S. Constitution thus served two purposes. First, the con-
ventions served as a means of legitimizing the new constitution in the 
name of the people;199 and second, as a filter for promoting delibera-
tion on the public good. 
Supermajority requirements and approval by successive legislatures 
are additional filters designed to approximate the will of the people as 
a whole and reduce the effects of factions. By requiring more than 
simple majority support, supermajority requirements theoretically 
promote careful consideration of the issues. Supermajority require-
ments accomplish this by forcing those in favor of a particular proposi-
tion to persuade a larger segment of the population. Supermajorities 
also lend legitimacy to the representative bodies proposing a constitu-
tional amendment. Because representative bodies like legislatures or 
conventions are composed of small groups of citizens, there is always 
the potential that their interests will diverge from the interests of the 
people as a whole. As Madison noted, "Men of factious tempers, of 
local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may ... betray the interests of 
the people. "200 Supermajorities make it more difficult for factions to 
take control of the amendment process in the representative arena by 
forcing them to gain significant support for proposed amendments. 
Similarly, approval by successive legislatures not only allows repre-
sentatives to carefully consider a proposed amendment, it allows the 
voters to express their views during the intervening election. This ex-
tended time period makes it easier for supporters and opponents of a 
particular measure to educate voters who can then elect officials that 
represent their viewpoints. 
The consent of the governed for the adoption or amendment of a 
constitution is obtained through ratification. The principle filters for 
establishing consent are representation and supermajority require-
ments. As discussed above, representative filters like ratification con-
ventions limit the effects of factions. They also assure that the people 
give informed consent. In the context of consent, supermajority re-
quirements reduce the influence of factions by increasing the numbers 
of citizens involved in the decisionmaking process. The filters bring 
the process of constitutional change closer to the ideal of unanimity. 
198. See generally Excerpts from Debate on Hoitse Term Limits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
30, 1995, at A20 (providing a recent example of representative deliberation); David E. 
Rosenbaum, Budgetary Posturing: Substance Losing Ground to Politics, N.Y. Tnnes, 
Mar. 2, 1995, at A1 (discussing proposed balanced budget amendment); Steven A. 
Holmes, Flag Amendment Sent to House Floor, N.Y. Tnnes, June 20, 1990, at A14 
(discussing the possibility of an amendment banning desecration of the flag). 
199. See supra part II.B. 
200. The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
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The higher the supermajority requirement the more accurately the 
constitutional amendment reflects the actual will of the people as a 
whole. Requirements of supermajority support are found in Article V 
and Article VH of the U.S. Constitution and historically, in the 
amendment provisions of many state constitutions.201 Even Thomas 
Jefferson, in later drafts of the Virginia Constitution, required super-
majoritarian support, "proposing that the Constitution ... be referred 
'to the people to be assembled in their respective counties and that 
the suffrages of two-thirds of the counties shall be requisite to estab-
lish it,' the Constitution then being unalterable 'but by the personal 
consent of the people.' "202 
Closely related to the supermajority requirement is the baseline for 
measuring votes. Despite existing state provisions, the baseline for 
measuring votes on an amendment should be all the eligible voters in 
the state. There are two important reasons for the use of this baseline. 
First, by expanding the number of voters that must approve an 
amendment to all the voters in the state, the baseline reduces the in-
fluence of factions. As Madison noted: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct par-
ties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and 
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same 
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a ma-
jority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the 
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will 
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each 
other.203 
By reducing the baseline to those voting on the proposal, states have 
wade it much easier for a small fraction of the conununity to pass 
amendments inimical to the public interest or the rights of other citi-
zens.204 W'nile factions may still be able to oppress others under the 
expanded baseline of all eligible voters, it would be far more difficult. 
Second, the baseline is an important tool for determining the consent 
of the people as a whole. Amendment procedures that measure the 
baseline by the entire electorate in the state provide a far more accu-
rate representation of the people as a whole than those that consider 
only those voting at the election or on the issue.205 
201. See Wood, supra note 81, at 308-09. 
202. Jd. at 309. 
203. The Federalist No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
204. See infra text accompanyh~g notes 242-52. 
205. See supra notes 139-40. 
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This leads to an important issue. When a constitution requires a 
particular number of votes to pass an amendment (i.e., supermajority 
of the eligible voters in a state, or supermajority or majority of votes 
at the election), how should non-votes be counted? Any ratification 
rule that examines more than the votes cast on a proposed amend-
ment must account for those who choose not to vote. In general, once 
a baseline is defined, non-votes within that group are treated as votes 
against the amendment because they reduce the number of votes 
available to reach the required minimum.206 Despite the general rule, 
at the beginning of this century before the· states liberalized their 
amendment procedures, several states attempted to set the default 
rule in favor of ratification.207 As one court stated, if "ten thousand 
qualified voters in the state ... did not vote at all on the question .... 
Why should they be'L counted in the negative? . . . . These electors 
either have no opinion on the subject, or they have none that they 
care to express. Why should they be counted as having voted in the 
negative, when they did not vote at all on the subject?"208 The court 
viewed non-voters as implicitly consenting to whatever the voters de-
cided. This position is based upon two arguments. The first argument 
is that those who vote represent the interests of nonvoters.209 The 
second is estonnel: "Vote and the choice is vours. Don't vote and the 
choice is thei;s."210 Courts treat nonvot~rs, because they stayed 
home, as if they acquiesced to the decision of those who voted.211 Ex-
isting amendment procedures that require only a majority vote of the 
voters on the issue or at the election appear to be based upon this 
position. 
Neither of these arguments is sufficiently persuasive to justify treat-
ing non-votes as abstentions or as votes in favor of a proposed consti-
tutional amendment. First, "We legitimately may question whether 
the full citizenry share the preferences of the subgroup who actually 
vote on the ballot proposition.'m2 Studies show that nonvoters in-
clude a disproportionate number of minorities, the poor, and the un-
206. For example, if an amendment requires a majority vote of the people voting in 
the particular election and only 50% plus one person voting in the election vote on 
the amendment, each vote cast on the amendment must be for it in order for it to 
pass. The nonvoting people count as votes against the amendment. 
207. Dodd, supra note 2, at 191-98. 
208. Green v. State Board of Canvassers, 5 Idaho 130, 141 (1896) (quoted in Dodd, 
supra note 2, at 192). 
209. Eule, supra note 55, at 1515. 
210. Id. 
211. See, e.g., Tmkel v. Griffin, 68 P. 859 (Mont. 1902) ("It is the theory of our 
government that those electors control public affairs who take a sufficient interest 
therein to give expression to their views. Those who refrain from such expression are 
deemed to yield acquiescence." (quoted in New Mexico ex rei. Witt v. State Canvass-
ing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 154 (N.M. 1968)). 
212. Eule, supra note 55, at 1514-15. 
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educated.213 As such, it is far less likely that they ·will h1 fact be 
represented by the disproportionate number of citizens of higher so-
cial and economic status who do vote.214 Second, arguments along the 
lines of estoppel are inappropriate when the voting process has built-
in obstacles that make it difficult for certain voters to exercise their 
right. Confusing ballot language, inconvenient polling times and loca-
tions, complex voting and registration requirements, and a history of 
voting discrimination all contribute to low voter turnout leaving the 
hands of those who vote far from clean.Z15 Finally, given these diffi-
culties, when the goal is to determine the fundamental law of a state 
as expressed by the people as a whole, affLrmative action is essential. 
If the people as a whole genuinely desire constitutional change, re-
quiring them to express that desire through the affirmative act of vot-
ing is not too much to ask. As one state court commented while 
discussing its requirement that only a majority of the people voting at 
the election ratify an amendment: 
This requires affirmative action. A majority of all those voting at 
the election must vote in favor of the proposition in order to adopt 
the same. The convention that framed the constitution doubtless 
[sic] presumed that if an amendment was necessary and really de-
sired by the people, a majority would favor its adoption .... 216 
When change is huportant enough and a genuine consensus exists, ob-
taining the requisite number of votes should not be an issue. In other 
words, a constiiutional quorum should exist before the business of 
constitutional change can be conducted. Vvhile a combination of fil-
ters may allow a simple majority of the state's eligible voters to adopt 
a constitution, this does not suggest that a minority of voters iil. a state 
can legitimately amend a constitution. 
While commentators have questioned the appropriateness of 
supermajority requirements, their critiques fail to recognize a princi-
ple justification for the requirements-they better approximate the 
213. !d. at 1515. 
214. Magleby, supra note 21, at 33-34 ("Voting on ballot propositions only ampli-
fies the social class bias in participation, because those with lower incomes or less 
education tend to skip voting on ballot questions at much higher rates."). 
215. See generally David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Proposi-
tions in the United States (1984) (discussing the process of direct legislation); Frances 
F. Piven & Richard A Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (1988) (discussing how 
the electoral process inhibits voting by lower and working class citizens); E. E. 
Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People 97-113 (1960) (noting the large percent-
age of nonvoters and discussing the causes and effects of this phenomena); A Leon 
Higginbotham, Jr., et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastat-
ing Racial Consequences, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1593 (1994) (describing the prevalence 
of racism in North Caroliila electoral politics and the racist practices used to keep 
African-Americans from voting); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money But by Virtue 
Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1455 (1994) (dis-
cussing the effects of vote trafficking). 
216. State ex ref. Stevenson v. Babcock, 22 N.W. 372, 375 (Neb. 1885). 
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will of the people as a whole. Commentators have challenged 
supermajority requirements as inegalitarian because they grant the 
minority veto power in the decisionmaking process.217 While the crit-
ics acknowledge these requirements' ability to protect minorities and 
promote both stability and deliberation, they feel that these results are 
outweighed by considerations of equality and various pragmatic con-
cerns.218 This conclusion may be appropriate under a statistical con-
ception of collective action; however, the criticism does not apply 
under the communal conception.219 Therefore, in the context of con-
stitutional change, these arguments fail to recognize the primary role 
of supermajority requirements. Supermajorities provide a more accu-
rate approximation of the will of the people as a whole. Although the 
protection of minority rights and the promotion of stability and delib-
eration are important goals, they are secondary benefits derived from 
a process meant to approximate the will of the people as a whole.220 
In summary, constitutional change is legitimate only when it repre-
sents the will of the people as a whole. The ideal requirement for 
determining that will is, of course, unanimity. If all the citizens in a 
state agree to a proposed amendment, there is no question that "the 
people" have spoken.221 Unfortunately, unanimity is an ideal that is 
practically unachievable in large communities. In lieu of unanimity, 
constitutional change is legitimate when accomplished through the use 
of a combination of procedural safeguards and filters that ensure that 
the adopted constitution or constitutional amendment represents the 
will of the people as a whole, promotes the public good, and safe-
guards the rights of dissenting citizens. These safeguards and filters, 
217. See Schlam, supra note 12, at 357-67; Note, Supermajority Voting Require-
ments: Possible Constitutional Objections, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 674, 674 (1970). The 
Supreme Court, however, has consistently upheld the constitutionality of requiring 
supermajority votes against equal protection challenges. See Town of Lockport v. Cit-
izens for Community Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S 259 (1977) (upholding the 
requirement that proposed changes in a county charter be approved by a majority of 
both city and non-city voters within a county, as opposed to a simple majority of all 
voters within tlle county); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding 
supermajority requirements). 
218. Schlam, supra note 12, at 363-64. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46. 
220. See supra part III.B. 
221. The 1\venty-Seventll Amendment raises tlle interesting question of how to de-
termine the will of the people over time. Can an amendment legitimately be ratified 
by considering a combination of voters over a period of two hundred years? In a 
recent article, Professor Paulsen argues that the principles which govern legislation 
should apply to constitutional amendments. See Paulsen, supra note 13 (arguing that 
consent based upon ratification by several generations is legitimate and legal). How-
ever, the concept of the people as a whole necessarily involves some limits on the time 
for ratifying amendments. The ratification of constitutional amendments is supposed 
to represent the consent of the people, not some people today and some people long 
since gone. As such, a better rule would limit the validity of constitutional ratifica-
tions to the consent of the living. Any other rule would allow the constitution to be 
amended by portions of the community over a period of time. 
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representation, deliberation, supermajority and baseline require-
ments, enter the process at two stages: proposal and· ratification. 
During the proposal stage these auxiliary procedures ensure that the 
drafting of the amendment reflects the will of the people. At the rati-
fication stage, they assure that the proposed constitutional change 
commands the support of the people as a whole. Without these filters 
and procedural safeguards for constitutional change, the connection 
between those in favor of an amendment and the dissenters would not 
be sufficient to fairly or sensibly hold the dissenters responsible for 
the proponents' actions. Under certain circumstances this may be ac-
ceptable for the creation of legislation and the adoption of statutes, 
but it is unacceptable for the adoption and alteration of a constitution 
which represents the fundamental law of a state and the will of the 
people as a whole. 
N. EXISTTI'-TG STATE PRACTICES 
While most people pay lip service to the principle that a constitu-
tion represents "the people," in practice many states have returned to 
the medieval conception of sovereignty that pits the people against 
the government. The only difference is that today the sovereign is 
defined as the will of a majority.222 Existing procedures for amending 
constitutions allow a minority of voters to alter the fundamental law 
of the state by defini11.g a majority in terms of those voting on the 
proposed amendment, instead of as a majority of citizens in the state 
or even a majority of eligible voters. For these reasons, many existing 
state procedures for constitutional change are illegitimate. The most 
flagrant of these procedures is the constitutional initiative, which, in 
several states, virtually eliminates any distinction between statutory 
and constitutionallaw.223 
In the name of efficiency, existing initiative procedures allow for 
constitutional change without unanimity or any republican filters.224 
222. See supra part HI.B. 
223. In severaj states the procedures for adopting a statute or a constitutional 
amendment are identical, see, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1, cl. 2 (amended 1980); or 
practically identical, see, e.g., Or. Const. art. IV, § 1(2)(b )-(c) (requiring signatures of 
6% of eligible state voters to propose a statute and 8% of the eligible state voters to 
propose a constitutional amendment); Cal. Elec. Code § 3524 (West 1977 & Supp. 
1994) (requiring signatures of 5% to propose a statute and 8% to propose a constitu-
tionaj amendment). In contrast, Massachusetts i;!itiative procedures carefully distin-
guish between legislation and constitutional amendments. See Mass. Const. art. 
XLVIII, pt. IV, § 1 (defining an "initiative amendment"); Mass. Const. art. XLVIII, 
pt. V, § 1 (stating the legislative procedure for an "initiative petition for a law"). 
224. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200 ("Except with reference to matters of great impor-
tance, it may therefore be said that [procedural safeguards make] constitutional alter-
ation too difficult .... "); Schlam, supra note 12, at 377 ("[T]here must be, at least 
initially, a sufficient ease and frequency of textual revision, if for no other reason than 
to provide evidence of popular fu-nenability to\vard change.'' (citation omitted)). See 
also Arrow, supra note 54, at 88 (constructing "a positive case for enhancement of the 
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This change is illegitimate because the procedures make no effort to 
ensure that the adopted amendment represents the will of the people 
as a whole. They allow a small number of citizens to draft and pro-
pose an amendment without any concern for the public good or the 
protection of dissenters' rights. Furthermore, a simple aggregation of 
a fraction of the state's citizens sharing personal preferences can then 
ratify the amendment.225 As one commentator noted, "Written in se-
cret by those who share a common view of societal problems, ballot 
propositions eschew compromise and tend toward extremism with ap-
palling frequency."226 Colorado's Amendment 2 is a perfect example 
of an amendment drafted by a private group in an effort to enforce 
their personal conception of morality at the expense of fellow citizens, 
and then ratified by a simple majority of votes on the issue.227 An 
initiative process with an absence of safeguards for representing the 
will of the people cannot legitimately effect constitutional change. 
The Federalists explicitly rejected constitutional initiatives because 
they would play to the public's prejudices and passions, and "constitu-
tions, in particular, need to be protected against the danger of 'inter-
esting too strongly the public passions [by] ... frequent reference of 
constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society.' "228 The 
initiative was inappropriate because during direct appeals to the pub-
lic, "'lhe passions therefore not the reason, of the public, would sit in 
judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone that ought to con-
troul and regulate the government. The passions ought to be con-
trouled and regulated by the government."229 Practical experience 
has since confirmed Madison's theoretic conclusions.230 
The fact that there is little to suggest that the initiative represents an 
informed decision on the part of the voters compounds the problems 
with the initiative. As Derrick Bell noted, "Appeals to prejudice, 
oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate con-
cerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex problems often 
characterize referendum and initiative campaigns."231 Studies on the 
initiative process have found that of the voters who actually vote on 
popular democratic devices, most particularly, for facilitation of the state constitu-
tional initiative"); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 54, at 162 (stating that the 
Framers "depriv[ ed] the majority of meaningful control over the content of the Con-
stitution, ... serving the efficiency goals of constitutionalism"). 
225. See infra notes 242-53 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado for Family 
Values' constitutional amendment initiative abolishing legal protection for 
homosexuals). 
226. Fischer, supra note 12, at 66. 
227. Amendment 2 was passed by approxintately 54% of the vote on the issue. See 
Schmalz, supra note 6. 
228. Linde, Campaign, supra note 5, at 33 (quoting The Federalist No. 49, at 340 
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982)). 
229. The Federalist No. 49, at 258 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
230. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
231. Bell, supra note 31, at 19. 
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the subject, "only fifteen percent of those surveyed felt that they con-
sistently knew enough about initiative measures to make a wise deci-
sion. "232 Voter manipulation compounds the lack of informed 
decisionmaking. Advertising campaigns, and even the wording of the 
measure, are often designed to mislead voters.233 For example, during 
an initiative campaign to give the bus and truck industry the right to 
pay a fiat tax in lieu of all other taxes, the supporters of the proposal, 
having failed to convince the public through education, distributed on 
billboards and leaflets- the- picture of a "big, fat, ugly pig" with the 
following slogan: "Drive the hog from the road! Vote yes on proposi-
tion number 2."234 The amendment passed overwhelmingly "because 
the voters thought they were voting against roadhogs. •ms This kind of 
misinformation and prejudice has tremendous influence on the pas-
sage of constitutional initiatives.236 
Money also influences the outcomes of constitutional. initiatives. 
Spending is often the single most powerful predictor of a proposal's 
success at every stage in the amendment process.Z37 For example, 
"One California public relations official boasted that he could put any 
issue on the California state ballot for $325,000.'>238 Lenient signature 
requirements and the use of professional signature gathering organi-
zations have virtually eviscerated any protection signature require-
~,. .. "')':1.0 ,...,. "'1 1 ..:I" • .... • • • • h 
ments anora.~~- ;:')IDlllar1y, spenumg mnuences lllitlat1ve outcomes ~Y 
"manipulat[ing] the electorate and monopoliz[ing] the 'market place 
of ideas.' "240 The initiative and referendum were tools that the pro-
232. Eule, supra note 55, at 1516. The study went on to discover that "[a]nother 
37% claimed to know enough about the issues involved to make a wise decision on 
ballot measures 'most' of the time. The remaining 47% admitted to confusion on a 
regular basis." Id. at n.46 (citing Joint Project of the USC Institute of Politics and 
Government & Common Cause (1985)). 
233. See id. at 1517-19; see also Weiser, supra note 31, at 925-35 (discussing how 
nondemocratic forces, such as low voter turnout, "the strong influence of money," 
and the manipulative framing of issues undermine the referendum procedure). 
234. Fischer, supra note 12, at 67 n.118 (quoting A. Shamish & B. Thomas, The 
Secret Boss of California 37-38 (1971)) (emphasis omitted). 
235. Id. 
236. Bell, supra note 31, at 21. 
237. Weiser, supra note 31, at 927 (citing Betty H. Zisk, Money, Media and Grass-
roots 90 (1987)). 
238. Bell, supra note 31, at 20. 
239. See, e.g., Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 922 (1975) (discussing various defects in the signature gathering pro-
cess); see also Bell, supra note 31, at 20 (criticizing the use of signature gathering 
companies for direct voting procedures). 
240. Weiser, supra note 31, at 927 (quoting Daniel Lowenstein, Campaign Spending 
and Ballot Proposition: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First 
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 505, 608 (1982)); see also Bell, supra note 31, at 20 
n.76 ("[T]he defeat of many consumer and environmental referenda is usually caused 
by major television campaigns which distort the issue and raise the false spectre of 
massive unemployment. [Ralph Nader] accused the atomic power industry and its 
allies of using such scare tactics promoted at a cost of millions of dollars." (citing 
Ralph Nader, Direct Democracy via Referenda, Wash. Star, Nov. 6, 1976, at C1)). 
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gressive movement designed to challenge representative government 
because it was corrupt and unresponsive to the people.241 As it exists 
today, however, the initiative process has been corrupted by the very 
same evils it was designed to correct. 
Colorado's recent experience with Amendment 2 demonstrates the 
constitutional initiative's deficiencies. Prior to 1992, the cities of Den-
ver, Aspen, and Boulder, and other local governments within Colo-
rado, enacted statutes which extended civil rights protection to 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.Z42 These statutes were designed to 
protect homosexuals from discrimination. In response, Colorado for 
Family Values ("CFV"), a local Colorado organization funded by 
prominent national religious organizations, sought to repeal these 
statutes and prohibit future statutes by performing an end run on the 
political process through the constitutional initiative.Z43 The organiza-
tion drafted Amendment 2 in private.244 The initiative process does 
not require public debates or hearings or solicitation of comments 
from the general public. Like all special interest groups, CFV had 
little need for debate on the merits of their proposed amendment. 
The organization's members shared a common vision on homosexual-
ity and proper social values.245 In fact, they formed the organization 
for the sole purpose of promoting its members' shared beliefs i.-·1 
Amendment 2.246 CFV drafted and proposed Amendment 2 without 
any consideration for other viewpoints, and, one may even argue, to 
spite those with different viewpoints.Z47 
241. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
242. Pamela Coukos, Recent Development, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs- The 
Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 581, 583 (1994). 
243. /d. at 583-84. 
244. Amendment 2 was apparently drafted by Will Perkins, the head of Colorado 
for Family Values. See Dirk Johnson, I Don't Hate Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 
1993, at 24. 
245. According to CFV, "Sexual molestation of children is a large part of many 
homosexuals' lifestyle-part of the very lifestyle 'gay rights' activists want govern-
ment to give special class, ethnic status!" Id. at 584 n.18 (quoting Colorado for Family 
Values, STOP Special Class Status for Homosexuality 2). Sinlilar sentiments were 
expressed by tlle proposers of tlle Oregon initiative who denounced homosexuality as 
"abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse," and akin to pedophilia, sadism, and mas-
ochism. See supra note 5. 
246. CFV was formed in 1991 in response to tlle successful enactment of local ordi-
nances protecting individuals from discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Its 
mission was to "pro-actively lead and assist tllose opposing the militant homosexual 
attack on traditional values." See Colorado for Family Values, Amendment 2 & Be-
yond (1993), quoted in Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 
2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Pro-
cess, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 841, 847 (1995). According to CFV's leader, the group will 
"disband if the anti-gay-rights measure was upheld in Colorado. 'Our guitar has one 
string.' " Johnson, supra note 244, at 24. 
247. CFV's mission statement reads: 
The mission of COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES is to pro-actively 
lead and assist tllose opposing tlle militant homosexual attack on traditional 
values; to act as a resource equipping grass-roots efforts through education 
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Colorado's ratification requirement did nothing to ensure that the 
amendment reflected the will of the people as a whole.248 CFV decep-
tively and inaccurately characterized the purpose of the amendment 
and homosexuals in generaF49 Rather than presenti.Ilg the voters 
with the issue of whether lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals should be 
protected under antidiscrimination laws, CFV successfully framed the 
issue of the amendment as a denial of special rights. CFV designed 
this misinformation to play to public fear and prejudice.250 As one 
commentator describedit,"Witha rallying cry of 'No Special Rights,' 
CFV argued that without Amendment 2, gay men, lesbians, and bisex-
uals would enjoy special status, including a legally protected right to 
commit pedophilia."251 Through this misinformation, CFV success-
fully encouraged a large rural turnout and overcame the proposition's 
primarily urban opposition by a bare majority of the votes on the pro-
posed amendment.252 Colorado's experience with Amendment 2 
clearly demonstrates how factions can manipulate the constitutional 
initiative to successfully propose and ratify a constitutional amend-
ment adverse to the rights of other citizens and a far cry from repre-
senting the will of the people as a whole. Given the ease with which a 
faction can manipulate the amendment process in the absence of ade-
and training of like-minded organizations and individuals across America 
dedicated to preserving the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, as-
sembly, belief and conscience protected by Colorado's Amendment 1\vo; to 
preserve the right to disagree with and resist, in a civil and compassionate 
manner, the forced affirmation of the homosexual lifestyle. 
Colorado for Family Values, Amendment 2 & Beyond (1993), quoted in Grauerholz, 
supra note 246, at 847 n.48. 
248. For constitutional amendment, the Colorado Constitution requires only a sim-
ple majority ratification by the people who vote on the amendment. See Colo. Const. 
art. V, § 1. 
249. For example, CFV used videos portraying gays as violent, flamboyant, and as 
threats to children. Johnson, supra note 244, at 24. The CFV video mischaracterized 
the purpose of the amendment: 
The riot is an example of what happens when gays mobilize, the film de-
clares, 'just one part of an aggressive nationwide offensive aimed at every 
segment of society to force the acceptance and approval of their chosen lifes-
tyle.' A shot of one protester's sign declaring a 'Queer Holy War' drives the 
point home. 
Heather Rhoads, Cruel Crusade: The Holy War Against Lesbians and Gays, Progres-
sive, Mar .. 1993, at 18 (1993). 
250. Weiser, supra note 31, at 929 n.l11 ("For example, Kevin Tebedo, co-founder 
of the CFV, testified that the CFV inaccurately and unfairly depicted homosexuals in 
its advertising to gain support for the amendment by portraying homosexuals as a 
dangerous group demanding 'special rights.' "). 
251. Coukos, supra note 242, at 584. 
252. Weiser, supra note 31, at 929 (citing Dirk Johnson, A Ban on Gay-Rights Laws 
Is Put on Hold in Colorado, N.Y. TilDes, Jan. 16, 1993, at A6). See supra text accom-
panying notes 58-62. The success of Colorado's initiative prompted the leader-of the 
Oregon anti-gay measure to vow to revisit the issue with a "Colorado-style" amend-
ment. Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1992, 
at A38. 
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quate safeguards, the constitutional initiative is a strikingly inappro-
priate method for constitutional change. 
The underlying purpose of a written constitution is to represent the 
will of the people as a whole and protect citizens from tyranny in all 
forms-including fellow citizens. As the Supreme Court of West Vir-
ginia stated: 
The underlying purpose of written constitutions is that there may be 
a safe and definite harbor for the ship of state in times of tempest. 
Great tribulations of government do not arise in periods of adminis-
trative calm. They manifest themselves when the clouds are heavy. 
It is then that a constitution proves its worth in preserving for the 
people those fundamental principles of free government which are 
indispensable to the well-being of our democratic institutions. 
If organic law be subverted through expediency, the basic guaran-
ties of liberty are thereby imperiled.253 
Existing state practices have apparently forgotten or rejected the basic 
principles of American constitutional democracy. Because the consti-
tutional initiative permits factions to adopt measures contrary to the 
public good and the rights of citizens, the factions cannot claim to le-
gitimately speak in the name of the people, and their measures cannot 
legitimately claim the pedigree of constitutional law. 
V. SoLUTIONS 
If we take seriously the Revolutionary idea that all political author-
ity is derived from the people as a whole, and not from some inconse-
quential portion of them, it becomes clear that procedures that allow a 
constitutional proposal to represent only a portion of the community 
cannot legitimately claim the authority to amend the fundamental or-
ganic law of the state-the constitution. Nevertheless, does illegiti-
mate necessarily mean illegal? Of course, deviations from the 
amendment procedures specified in a constitution are illegaJ.254 While 
a comprehensive discussion of these remedies is beyond the purview 
of this Article, this section briefly sketches some possible legal reme-
dies when the amendment procedures specified by the constitution it-
self are illegitimate. In terms of formulating judicial standards, one 
should keep in mind that while evaluating various procedures for con-
stitutional change, unanimity is the ideal condition for legitimate con-
stitutional change. The level of scrutiny applied to amendment 
253. Berry v. Fox, 172 S.E. 896, 903 (W.Va. 1934). 
254. Dodd, supra note 2, at 212. 
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a consti-
tutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the require-
ments of an existing constitution is a judicial question . . . . [I]t is the 
absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the constitution has 
been amended in a manner required by the co11stitution .... 
Jd. at 214 (quoting McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392, 409-10 (1909)). 
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procedures should correspond with the degree of deviation from the 
ideal. 
If we allow states to serve as laboratories of democracy and radi-
caHy experiment with the principles of government, federal courts 
must take the role of the U.S. Constitution as a means of protecting 
individual rights more seriously.255 As Justice Brennan observed: 
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard 
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the pro-
tective role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten 
that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a 
double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.256 
States may only experiment with democracy because the U.S. Consti-
tution provides a secure safety net. 
The most obvious federal source of protection is the Republican 
Guaranty Clause.257 While the Supreme Court has limited the scope 
of the Guaranty Clause,Z58 given the absence of adequate procedural 
safeguards, illegitimate state constitutional amendment procedures, 
like the initiative, provide a clear example of a justiciable claim. As 
Judge Wisdom wrote: 
The line of judicial development of the republican guarantee, bent 
and broken since Luther v. Borden, is not beyond repair. Some 
day, in certain circumstances, the judicial branch may be the most 
appropriate branch of government to enforce the Guaranty Clause. 
Federal courts should be loath to read out of the Constitution as 
judicially nonenforceable a provision that the Founding Fathers con-
sidered essential to formulation of a workable federalism.259 
As one commentator has noted, "[C]Iaiil1S under the Guaranty Clause 
may be justiciable where the violation of the republican norm is 
clear. "260 As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the people as a 
whole are the source of constitutional authority. This is the funda-
mental and first principle of republican government which distin-
olli<::hf'<:: thP rPnllhlir::~n form nf arnrP;rnmPnt f;rnm <>11 nthP"" 2nl 1 TnlP<:<: o---'-'--'-''-' v--'-' _._.....t"'._.._._....,..__ __ _ ._.. ____ ......,_ O'-'V-.Jl..LJL..II..Jl.Jl'-'_.._.._ ... .Jl.II.-"-".J..JI_Jl. ...... ..~~....._ ......, ........... .___.._u. .__.,...._...__.._....._..._. 
constitutional change represents the will of the people as a whole, it is 
255. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., clissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). 
256. Brennan, supra note 7, at 502-03. 
257. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... "). 
258. See, e.g., Edward A Stelzer, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforce-
ment of the Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870 (1993) ( cliscussing the Supreme 
Court's position that issues arising under the guaranty clause are nonjusticiable polit-
ical questions). 
259. Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 985 (E.D. La. 1968) (Wisdom, J., concur-
ring) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 393 U.S. 531 (1969). 
260. Fischer, supra note 12, at 62. 
261. See supra part II.B. 
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as illegitimate and inimical to liberty and the principles of constitu-
tional government as any permanent military government.262 The ab-
sence of adequate safeguards that guaranty the conditions of 
democratic membership make the constitutional initiative a clear ex-
ample of a violation of the republican norm. Procedures for constitu-
tional change can be seen along a spectrum of legitimacy and legality 
with.unanimity on one end and Colorado~style initiatives on the other. 
While the legality of these procedures may at points become a ques-
tion of degree (i.e., how many and what kinds of filters are adequate), 
the Supreme Court is quite capable of applying this analysis when 
constitutional rights are concerned.263 By undermining the principles 
that form the foundation of constitutional governance, existing state 
amendment procedures provide a clear case for Guaranty Clause 
protection. 
The constitutional initiative and similar state amending procedures 
may also violate what some commentators have described as the due 
process of lawmaking.264 Under this concept, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires rationality and delibera-
tion.265 One commentator also suggests that state constitutional 
amendments could be subject to attack based upon vagueness.266 Fi-
nally, the Fourteenth Amendment always provides general restraints 
on the substance of state constitutional amendments.267 As Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted, "It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legisla-
262. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962) (stating that the Guaranty Clause 
may be invoked by the judiciary in the case where a state has established a permanent 
military government). 
263. The Supreme Court regularly applies an undue burden analysis in cases con-
cerning constitutional rights. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) 
(applying undue burden analysis to abortion); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968) (applying undue burden analysis to free speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (applying ilndue burden analysis to religious freedom). 
264. See e.g., Hans A. Unde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 
(1976) (discussing what due process means as a constitutional standard for lawmak-
ing) [hereinafter Linde, Due Process]; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Insular Majorities 
Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 91 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1373, 1418 (1978) (stating that the claim for a "due process of lawmaking" 
requirement is particularly strong when substantial constitutional values are in jeop-
ardy and where judicial review of legislative enactments is largely unavailable). 
265. See Linde, Due Process, supra note 264, at 222-35; see also Fischer, supra note 
12, at 72-76 (proposing that a process of principled decisionmaking would satisfy the 
requirements of due process); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 134-35 (arguing that de-
mocracy requires that political outcomes be produced by an extended process of de-
liberation and discussion). 
266. Fischer, supra note 12, at 66-69. 
267. See, e.g, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that a California 
State Constitutional amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the state was involved in racial discrimination); Evans v. 
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (holding that Amendment 2 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution), cert. 
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995); Coukos, supra note 242, at 597 (arguing that Amend-
ment 2 fails to meet the rational basis test). 
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tive body enacted [this law], because the voters may no more violate 
the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body 
may do so by enacting legislation. "268 
State courts and constitutions may also provide legal protection. 
State courts may examine the legality of amendment procedures 
under the U.S. Constitution.269 While the federal arguments are not 
without their difficulties, it is far more difficult to argue that existing 
state amendment procedures are illegal under the state constitution. 
One legal theory is tharthese practices violate the particular state con-
stitution's popular sovereignty clause.270 State courts could also ex-
amine many existing amendment procedures under· the same 
principles and with the same scrutiny applied to regular legislative acts 
under the theory that, in some cases, an amendment may not legiti-
mately be fundamental constitutional law. This practice would explic-
itly recognize what many state ·courts have implicitly recognized for 
years.271 Finally, state courts may analyze the constitutional initiative 
under the "ratchet principle" articulated by the· Supreme Court in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan,Z72 which would allow the initiative to expand 
constitutionally protected rights but not diminish them.Z73 If all else 
fails, and factions continue to abuse state constitutions and their 
amendment processes, there is always revolution. 
CoNcLusioN 
In an age of growing factionalism and discord, as new and previ-
ously silent groups begin to assert themselves in the political arena, as 
old groups struggle to "maintain their own," we must never forget that 
the underlying purpose of a written constitution is to organize a gov-
ernment and a society in which we all can live. While at times we will 
disagree, we will have agreed on how to disagree. Gone are the days 
when brute force and raw power were sufficient to legitimate political 
authority. The American legacy is the principle that government must 
command the respect of the entire people, lest society disintegrate 
268. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 
454 u.s. 290, 295 (1981). 
269. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1335; Stelzer, supra note 258. 
270. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
271. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982) (stating 
that a provision's simple inclusion in the state constitution does not automatically 
classify it as fundamental for the purposes of equal protection analysis); Lujan v. Col-
orado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982) ("The Colorado Constitu-
tion does not restrict itself to addressing only those areas deemed fundamental. 
Rather, it contains provisions which are both equally suited for statutory enactment 
... as well as those deemed fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty .... " 
(citations omitted)). 
272. 384 u.s. 641 (1966). 
273. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (1966) (arguing that Congress has the power 
to expand t.lJe rights recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment, but cannot reduce 
those rights, much like a one-way rachet). 
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into warring factions and plunge us all into a nightmarish Hobbesian 
state of nature. A constitution represents the framework in which we 
memorialize the principles on which we all agree-especially the 
methods by which we agree to disagree. Failure to include a group or 
individual within this framework necessarily excludes them from the 
constitution's and, therefore, the government's legitimate authority. 
Legitimate constitutional change is an extraordinary act, not be-
cause the procedures themselves must be difficult for the sake of be-
ing difficult, but because it reflects the magnitude of the task-
arriving at the consensus of the governed. The principle that the peo-
ple are the fountain of all power is the very foundation of American 
constitutional democracy and has been reaffirmed throughout our na-
tion's history. This principle does not mean, however, that our consti-
tutional governments and the rights they protect are secure, or that 
the actions perpetrated in the name of "We the People" are always 
just. Noah Webster was right when he said that "[l]iberty is never 
secured by such paper declarations; nor lost for want of them. "274 
And, as Bruce Ackerman eloquently noted: 
There is simply no escaping the fact that the fate of the Constitution 
is in our hands-as voters, representatives, justices. If we allow 
ourselves to abuse the tradition of higher lawmaking, the very idea 
that the Constitution can be viewed as the culminating expression of 
a mobilized citizenry will disintegrate. After all, the American Re-
public is no more eternal than the Roman-and it will come to an 
end when American citizens betray their Constitution's fundamen-
tal ideals and aspirations so thoroughly that existing institutions 
merely parody the public meanings they formerly conveyed.275 
The legitimacy of constitutional change is not simply an academic 
question. The procedures and their outcomes affect the lives of real 
people. The day after Amendment 2 was passed, a despondent Colo-
rado citizen committed suicide rather than live in a state that would 
sanction discrimination against its citizens. Hauntingly reminiscent of 
Patrick Henry's bold revolutionary declaration,276 the suicide note 
read, "I refuse to live in a state where a few people can, at will, make 
my life a living hell."277 Justice and the legitimacy of constitutional 
governance depend upon our continued commitment to the principle 
274. Wood, supra note 81, at 377. 
275. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 291. 
276. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Second Virginia Convention (Mar. 23, 1775) ("Is 
life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? 
Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give 
me liberty, or give me death!"), reprinted in The American Reader: Words that 
Moved a Nation 20 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1990). 
277. Jana Mazanec, Colorado Gays Say Harassment Escalating, USA Today, Nov. 
12, 1992, at 3A. 
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of "government of the people, by the people, for the people.'m8 Ulti-
mately, we are responsible, individually and collectively, for the just-
ness and continued legitimacy of our government. 
278. Abraham LincoLn, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in The 
American Reader, supra note 275, at 151. 
